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L Introduction
By characterizing emotional distress as pam and suffering, courts
traditionally have allowed recovery of damages for emotional injury resulting
directly from a tortiously caused physical injury 1 However, courts long have
struggled with the issue of emotional distress as an independent cause of
action.2 Most decisions on this issue in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries denied recovery I The rationale behind these decisions often rested
* The author would like to express his gratitude to Jim Lake and Professor Laura S.
Fitzgerald for their assistance m the development of this Note.
1. See W PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEEON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12,
at 55 (5th ed. 1984) (stating well-recognized rule that emotional distress may form substantial
part of award for physical injury); d. § 54, at 363 (noting that courts award parasitic damages
for emotional distress when plaintiff establishes cause of action through proof of physical harm);
Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV L. REV
1033, 1048 (1936) (noting familiar rule that courts only award damages for emotional distress
that is parasitic to recognized cause of action); William L. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL.
L. REV 40, 42-43 (1956) [hereinafter Prosser, Insult and Outrage] (noting that recognized tort
served as "a peg upon which to hang the mental damages"); William L. Prosser, Intentional
Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV 874, 879-80 (1939) thereinafter
Prosser, A New Tort] (same).
2. See KEnTON Er AL., supra note 1, § 12, at 54-55 (noting reluctance of courts to
accept cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress); d. § 54, at 360 (stating
that courts were even more reluctant to recognize cause of action for negligently inflicted
emotional distress); Prosser, A New Tort, supra note 1, at 874 (noting reluctance of courts to
accept interest in peace of mind as worthy of legal protection); see also Magruder, supra note
1, at 1058 (noting that recovery of emotional distress damages was at intermediate stage of
development-between parasitic and independent-and predicting that courts would recognize
independent cause of action for emotional distress resulting from defendant's outrageous
conduct); Prosser, A New Tort, supra note 1, at 892 (predicting that courts would treat
intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress caused by outrageous conduct as independent
tort).
3. See KEaTON r AL., supra note 1, § 12, at56 (noting that early cases denied recovery
of emotional distress damages unless plaintiff could bring damages claim under scope of
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on the argument that such claims are so difficult to substantiate that to allow
recovery for emotional distress as an independent cause of action would
encourage fraudulent claims.4 Gradually, however, courts in all jurisdictions
overcame this fear of fraudulent claims and recognized an independent cause
of action for emotional distress when the plaintiff meets certain threshold
requirements-for example, outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant
or physical manifestations of the emotional distress-that ensure the genuine-
ness of the clama.5
In the last several years, several courts have considered whether to
grant damages for emotional distress alone in "fear-of-AIDS" or "AIDS-
phobia" cases.6 In such a case, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant's
negligent or intentional act exposed the plaintiff to the Human Immunodefi-
ciency Virus (HIV)-the virus that causes Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS)-and claims to have suffered emotional distress as a result
of that exposure.7 AIDS-phobia cases are distinct from AIDS-infection cases.
In the latter, the plaintiff actually has contracted AIDS or has tested HIV-
recognized tort).
4. See Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222, 226 (P.C. 1888)
(asserting that recognition of independent cause of action for emotional distress would open wide
field for imaginary claims); KEETON Er AL., supra note 1, § 12, at 56 (noting courts' concern
that recognition of cause of action for emotional distress would open wide door to fictitious
claims and "litigation m the field of trivialities and mere bad manners"); Prosser, Insult and
Outrage, supra note 1, at 42 (same); Prosser, A New Tort, supra note 1, at 877 (same); see also
Archibald H. Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV L. REV 260, 276 (1921)
(presenting argument that allowance of damages for nervous shock caused by fright might allow
recovery for fraudulent claims, but responding that policy of preventing fraudulent claims
should not preclude recovery for genuine claims).
5. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 12, at 60 (noting that courts around 1930 began
to recogmze cause of action for intentionally inflicted emotional distress that defendant's
extreme and outrageous conduct caused); id. § 54, at 364 (noting that most courts allow
recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress upon proof of physical injury); Prosser,
Insult and Outrage, supra note 1, at 43 (noting that courts have insisted upon guarantee of
genuineness consisting of physical injury or outrageousness of defendant's conduct because
emotional distress is easy to feign and difficult to deny); Prosser, A New Tort, supra note 1, at
878 (stating that court may deny recovery of emotional distress damages absent sufficient
assurance of genuineness of clain and noting that outrageousness requirement serves as
guarantee of seriousness of emotional distress).
6. See Debbie E. Liamn, Note, The Fear of Disease as a Compensable Injury: An
Analysis of Claims Based on AIDS Phobia, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv 77, 78 (1993) (recognizing
AIDS-phobia cases as newest branch of fear-of-disease cases).
7 See id. at 90 (describing AIDS-phobia claim).
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positive; m the former, by contrast, the plaintiff has tested negative for the
virus up to and throughout the trial.'
Some courts that have confronted AIDS-phobia cases require the
plaintiff to prove actual exposure to the virus to demonstrate the reasonable-
ness of the plaintiff's fear and, thus, the genuineness of the claim.9 Other
courts have allowed recovery absent a showing of actual exposure.10 Some
courts require the plaintiff to prove that physical injury resulted from the
emotional distress. Others do not require proof of physical injury 12
The Supreme Court of Virgima has yet to address this issue. 13 This
Note argues that the doctrines governing Virginia's independent cause of
8. See Stephanie B. Goldberg, AIDS Phobia: Reasonable Fears or Unreasonable
Lawsuits?, A.B.A. J., June 1992, at 88, 88 (stating that gravamen of AIDS-phobia suit is
alleged exposure to AIDS, regardless of whether plaintiff develops HIV).
9. See Carroll v Sisters of Saint Francis Health Servs., Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585, 594
(Tenn. 1993) (requiring proof of actual exposure to AIDS virus for recovery of damages for
negligently inflicted emotional distress); Johnson v West Va. Umv Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d
889, 893 (W Va. 1991) (same).
10. See Kerns v Hartley, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 632 (Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting actual
exposure requirement in AIDS-phobia case), vacated and transferred for reconsideration, 868
P.2d 906 (Cal. 1994); Faya v. Alnaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 336-37 (Md. 1993) (same).
11. See Faya, 620 A.2d at 338-39 (requiring that plaintiff show physical injury m order
to recover emotional distress damages); Johnson, 413 S.E.2d at 892 (same).
12. See Carroll, 868 S.W.2d at 593-94 (requiring proof of actual exposure to AIDS m
place of physical injury requirement).
13. But cf. Howard v Alexandria Hosp., 429 S.E.2d 22, 24-25 (Va. 1993) (allowing
plaintiff to recover emotional distress damages for fear of contracting AIDS when emotional
distress was pendent to claim of medical malpractice). In Howard, during the plaintiff's
operation at defendant hospital, the attending medical personnel negligently used unsterilized
equipment. Id. at 23. The plaintiff underwent a battery of tests, vomited "continuously," and
developed vaginal discharge as a side effect of antibiotics that her doctors had prescribed to
prevent infection from the use of the unsterilized equipment. Id. at 24. The defendant argued
to the Supreme Court of Virginia that the plaintiff had attempted to state a cause of action for
negligently inflicted emotional distress without alleging physical injury, an omission that would
warrant dismissal of the action under Virginia law. Id. Disagreeing, the court stated somewhat
obliquely that Howard had not alleged negligently inflicted emotional distress as an independent
cause of action, but had claimed emotional distress damages pendent to her claim of medical
malpractice. Id. at 24-25; see also Ney v. Landmark Educ. Corp., No. 92-1979, 1994 WL
30973, at *5 (4th Cir. Feb. 2, 1994) (per curam) (construing Howard as addressing claim of
emotional distress arising out of physical injury, not physical injury arising out of emotional
distress). But see Tischler v Dimenna, 609 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1008 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (citing
Howard for proposition that some junsdictions have allowed AIDS-phobia claim without proof
of actual exposure).
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action for emotional distress offer the appropriate analysis for deciding
AIDS-phobia claims.14 This Note first discusses the development in
Virginia of the independent cause of action for the infliction of emotional
distress, both intentional and negligent.15 The most significant hurdle for
a plaintiff alleging intentionally inflicted emotional distress is the require-
ment of outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant.16 To recover for
the negligent infliction of emotional distress, on the other hand, the plaintiff
generally must demonstrate a physical injury resulting from that emotional
distress, a requirement that seeks to ensure the genuineness of the claim.'7
This Note then discusses significant AIDS-phobia cases from other
jurisdictions and the policy reasons underlying those decisions. 8 Because
these policies are nearly identical to the policies underlying Virginia's
existing emotional distress doctrine, Virginia should rely on its well-
developed emotional distress case law to determine whether a plaintiff has
stated a cause of action arising from the fear of AIDS.19 Hence, the
Virgima Supreme Court should apply the outrageousness standard to fear-of-
AIDS claims alleging the intentional infliction of emotional distress." In
negligence cases, the court should require plaintiffs to demonstrate either a
physical manifestation of emotional distress or actual exposure to the
disease-carrying virus."
14. See infra notes 315-22 and accompanying text (arguing that Virgima courts should
apply established precedent to cause of action for AIDS-phobia).
15. See mnfra notes 22-125 and accompanying text (discussing watershed cases in
Virginia concerning recovery of damages for emotional distress as independent cause of
action).
16. See mnfra notes 38-64 and accompanying text (discussing requirement of
outrageousness to recover damages for intentionally inflicted emotional distress).
17 See mnfra notes 93-125 and accompanying text (discussing requirement of physical
injury resulting from defendant's tortious conduct in order to recover damages for negligently
inflicted emotional distress).
18. See infranotes 141-275 and accompanying text (discussing important AIDS-phobia
cases m wlch plamtiff alleged either intentionally or negligently inflicted emotional distress).
19. See mnfra notes 276-314 and accompanying text (noting that policy arguments in
AIDS-phobia cases and in Virginia's emotional distress case law are nearly identical).
20. See mnfra notes 276-89 and accompanying text (arguing that Virgima should apply
established test for intentionally inflicted emotional distress to AIDS-phobia claim).
21. See infra notes 290-314 and accompanying text (arguing that Virgima should apply
established case law of negligently inflicted emotional distress to AIDS-phobia claum). This
AIDS-PHOBIA
Hf. The Development of an Independent Cause of Action for
Emotional Distress in Virginia
A. Intentionally Inflicted Emotional Distress
At common law, a plaintiff generally could not recover damages for
emotional distress unless the plaintiff's emotional distress claim was pendent
to a claim of physical injury resulting from the defendant's tortious
conduct.' The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia did not address the
issue of independent recovery for intentionally or willfully inflicted
emotional distress until its 1932 decision in Bowles v. May I In Bowles,
the plaintiff, Mae May, claimed damages for the emotional distress that
Agee Bowles's threatening remarks and gestures allegedly caused.'
Bowles had learned that Mrs. May and her husband had been spreading
rumors about Bowles's illicit relationship with the wife of his business
associate, a neighbor of the Mays.' Bowles went to the May household in
Note's analysis of Virginia law may not extend to cases in which the plaintiff alleges fear of
contracting AIDS as a result of extramarital or premarital consensual sexual intercourse.
Virginia adheres to the common-law rule that precludes a party who consents to unmoral or
illegal conduct from recovering damages from other participants for the consequences of that
conduct. Zysk v. Zysk, 404 S.E.2d 721,722 (Va. 1990). In Zysk, the plaintiff alleged that
her former husband had transmitted Herpes Simplex Type 2 to her through consensual sexual
intercourse occurring shortly before their marriage. Id. at 721. Because the intercourse at
issue occurred before the marriage, the Virginia Supreme Court noted that the parties'
conduct violated Virginia's fornication statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (Miche 1988).
Zysk, 404 S.E.2d at 721-22. As a consensual participant m an illegal act, the plaintiff was
precluded from recovering damages in tort arising out of the illegal conduct. Id. at 722. The
same analysis may apply to an AIDS-phobia claim based on similar facts. Tins Note,
however, takes no position on this issue. But see Doe v. Roe, 841 F Supp: 444, 447 n.8
(D.D.C. 1994) (criticizing Zysk on ground that fornication statute is dead letter and noting
that Zysk essentially immunizes from liability those who intentionally or negligently spread
sexually transmitted diseases).
22. See, e.g., Bruce v. Madden, 160 S.E.2d 137, 140 (Va. 1968) (allowing recovery
for mental anguish resulting directly from tortiously caused physical injury even though
plaintiff offered no proof of mental anguish at trial); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Clements, 34 S.E. 951, 952 (Va. 1900) (allowing jury to infer existence of plaintiffs mental
anguish from tortiously caused physical injury); Norfolk & W Ry. v. Marpole, 34 S.E. 462,
464 (Va. 1899) (same).
23. 166 S.E. 550 (Va. 1932).
24. Bowles v. May, 166 S.E. 550, 552 (Va. 1932).
25. Id.
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order to confront the plaintiff and her husband about these rumors.26 The
plaintiff alleged that Bowles threatened criminal prosecution of the Mays
during this confrontation and generally was "threatening, menacing,
boisterous and beastly "27 A second similar encounter occurred five days
later." On the night of the first encounter, Mrs. May, a woman of delicate
health, was nervous and unable to sleep; after the second encounter, she
suffered a "stroke of paralysis."29 On the basis of this evidence, the jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff.' The Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia reversed."1
The supreme court first acknowledged that severe fright can result
in a "wreck to the nervous system, the consequence of which may be a
visible physical injury "' When this fright results from a willful, wanton,
and vindictive wrong, the court held that recovery is available. 3 But, in
order to ensure the genuineness of such a claim, the court heightened the
burden of proof: to prevail, a plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant committed a willful tortious act and that a chain
of unbroken causal connection exists between that act and the plaintiff's
physical injury ' The court explained:
This case falls within a class which is not favored.
While the possible success of unrighteous or groundless actions
should not bar recovery in a meritorious case, nevertheless,






31. Id. at 557
32. Id. at 556.
33. Id., see Moore v. Jefferson Hosp., Inc., 158 S.E.2d 124, 127 (Va. 1967) (finding
that defendant nurse's unwarranted refusal to allow patient or doctor m operating room
constituted willful and intentional action sufficient to support patient's cause of action for
intentionally inflicted emotional distress); cf. Ferrell v Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Employees
Hosp. Ass'n, 336 F Supp. 833, 836, 838 (W.D. Va. 1971) (recognizing cause of action for
emotional distress that defendant caused through intentional acts directed towards thirdperson
closely related to plaintiff, but denying recovery on grounds that plaintiff failed to establish
that defendant's conduct was willful, wanton, intentional, or vindictive).
34. Bowles, 166 S.E. at 557
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feigned without detection, the court should allow no recovery in
a doubtful case.3'
The court found that Mrs. May did not prove by clear and convincing
evidence that Bowles's tirade caused her to suffer mental shock so severe as
to cause nervous trauma. 6 Because Mrs. May failed to establish a clear
causal link between Bowles's actions and Mrs. May's stroke, the court
reversed the jury verdict in Mrs. May's favor.'
In 1974, in Womack v Eldridge," the Supreme Court of Virginia
recognized a distinct cause of action for intentionally inflicted emotional
distress, one that requires no proof of physical injury In Womack,
Rosalie Eldridge was an investigator for a defense attorney representing
Richard Seifert in a child molestation case.' Eldridge posed as a news-
paper reporter and told Danny Lee Womack that she wanted his picture for
a news story 4' Believing that Eldridge was indeed a reporter, Womack
allowed her to take his photograph.42 The defense attorney then presented
the photograph to children whom Seifert allegedly molested in an attempt to
have the children identify Womack as the molester.43 Although the
children stated that Womack was not the molester, the Commonwealth's
Attorney nonetheless requested that Womack testify in court." Although
the Commonwealth did not bring charges against him, Womack sued
Eldridge claiming damages for the emotional distress that her wanton,




38. 210 S.E.2d 145 (Va. 1974).
39. Womack v Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1974); cf. Bowles v May, 166
S.E. 550, 557 (Va. 1932) (requiring proof of physical injury to recover damages for willfully
inflicted emotional distress).





45. Id. at 147.
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plaintiff, but the trial judge set aside the verdict for lack of physical damages
or bodily harm.46
The supreme court reversed the trial judge and reinstated the jury's
verdict.47 Relying on section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(Restatement)48 and the Supreme Court of Utah's decision in Samms v.
Eccles,49 the court ruled that a plaintiff must prove four elements in order
to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress when there is no
physical injury-' (1) the wrongdoer's conduct was intentional or reck-
less;5 (2) the conduct was outrageous or intolerable;' (3) the alleged
46. Id. at 146.
47 Id. at 149.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) [hereinafter R.STATEMENT].
49. 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961). in Samms, the Supreme Court of Utah considered
whether to recogize an independent cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Samms v Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 344-47 (Utah 1961). The plaintiff, a married
woman, alleged that the defendant persistently annoyed her with proposals that she have
sexual relations with hun; as a result of his conduct, she claimed to have suffered severe
emotional distress. Id. at 345. Rejecting the argument that it should disallow such an action
because of the possibility of groundless claims, the court, in a three-to-two decision,
formulated a test based on Restatement § 46. Id. at 346-47 The test, which the plaintiff in
Samms satisfied, allowed recovery for emotional distress absent bodily impact or physical
injury when the defendant intentionally acted either with the purpose of inflicting emotional
distress or when any reasonable person would have known that such distress would result.
Id. Additionally, the defendant's actions must have been outrageous and intolerable-that is,
offensive to society's generally accepted standards. Id. at 347 Twojustices dissented on the
ground that the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant intended to injure the plaintiff or
that he should have known that hIs conduct would result in the plaintiff s emotional distress.
Id. (Callister, J., dissenting); see RESTATEMENT, supra note 48, § 46 cmt. j (stating
requirement, accepted in Womack, that emotional distress be severe).
50. Womack, 210 S.E.2d at 148.
51. See Ely v. Whitlock, 385 S.E.2d 893, 897 (Va. 1989) (holding that plaintiff failed
to allege that defendant attorneys intended conduct to inflict emotional distress); Ruth v
Fletcher, 377 S.E.2d 412, 416 (Va. 1989) (holding that defendant did not intend to cause
emotional distress through successful attempt to prove that plaintiff was not father of her
child); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Dowdy, 365 S.E.2d 751,754 (Va. 1988) (finding
evidence insufficient to support plaintiffs claim that defendant intentionally inflicted
emotional distress); see also Carstensen v Chnsland Corp., 442 S.E.2d 660, 668 (Va. 1994)
(denying recovery for intentionally inflicted emotional distress on grounds that defendant's
alleged breach of fiduciary duty did not constitute willful, wanton, or vindictive conduct).
52. See mfra note 55 (listing cases in which outrageousness element was dispositive).
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wrongful conduct and emotional distress were connected causally;53 and
(4) the distress was severe.' Additionally, the Womack court adopted the
Restatement's requirement that the trial court first determine whether a jury
reasonably could find that the defendant's conduct was so extreme and
outrageous as to permit recovery 5 If reasonable persons could differ on
53. See Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 950 (4th Cir. 1988) (implicitly finding
causal connection between defendant's wrongful conduct and plaintiff's emotional distress
even though plaintiff was never present when defendant directed outrageous conduct toward
daughter); Haigh v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 676 F Supp. 1332, 1355 (E.D. Va. 1987)
(implicitly finding causal connection between defendants' wrongful conduct and plaintiff's
emotional distress even though defendants did not direct their outrageous acts towards
plaintiff).
54. See Russo v White, 400 S.E.2d 160, 163 (Va. 1991) (holding in four-to-three
decision that to recover under Womack emotional distress must be so severe "that no
reasonable person could be expected to endure it") (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 48, § 46
cmt. j). The Russo majority stated that Womack requires the plaintiff to prove each of the
test's four elements by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 162. However, the court did
not discuss this evidentiary issue because the case was before the court upon the trial court's
grant of the defendant's demurrer to the pleadings. Id. No subsequent decision has cited
Russo for the proposition that Womack required clear and convincing evidence. See
Beardsley v. Isom, 828 F Supp. 397, 400 (E.D. Va. 1993) (citing Russo only for proposition
that defendant's conduct must go beyond all bounds of decency).
55. Womack, 210 S.E.2d at 148 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 48, § 46 cmt. h).
The court's initial determination of outrageousness in an action for the intentional infliction
of emotional distress has been the source of most of the published decisions in this area of
Virginia law. See Paroline v Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 112-13 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding
that defendant's alleged sexual harassment of plaintiff did not rise to level of outrageousness
required under Virginia law), vacated inpart, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990); Gaiters v Lynn,
831 F.2d 51, 54 (4th Cir. 1987) (concluding that country singer's racially insensitive remarks
did not constitute outrageous conductunder Virginia law); Beardsley, 828 F Supp. at 400-01
(holding that defendant's acts of gender-based retaliation did not constitute outrageous
conduct); Simmons v Norfolk & W Ry., 734 F Supp. 230, 232 (W.D. Va. 1990) (finding
that defendant's alleged cursing and screaming at plaintiff at work did not rise to level of
outrageous conduct); Hams v Norfolk & W Ry., 720 F Supp. 567, 568 (W.D. Va. 1989)
(finding that public announcement of plaintiff's demotion did not constitute outrageous
conduct); Timms v. Rosenblum, 713 F Supp. 948, 955 (E.D. Va. 1989) (holding that
plaintiff failed to show outrageousness of defendant attorneys' alleged malpractice), aff'd, 900
F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1990); Owens v Ashland Oil, Inc., 708 F Supp. 757, 760 (W.D. Va.
1989) (finding that defendant's decision to terminate plaintiff's employment was neither
extreme nor outrageous); Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co. v Bumbrey, 665 F Supp. 1190, 1204
(E.D. Va. 1987) (holding that insurance company's attempt to enforce releases through
litigation did not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct); Woodring v Board of Grand
Trustees of the Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 633 F Supp. 583, 593 (W.D. Va.
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that issue, then the trial court must send the case to the jury " Because
reasonable persons could differ as to whether the defendant's conduct in
Womack was extreme and outrageous, the trial judge properly submitted the
case to the jury I Accordingly, the supreme court reinstated the jury's
verdict."8
In announcing this new cause of action allowing emotional distress
damages absent proof of physical injury, the Utah Supreme Court in Samms
v Eccles,5 9 upon which the Womack court relied, presented policy
considerations strikingly similar to those stated in Bowles.' The Samms
court first acknowledged that the fact that "some claims may be spurious
should not compel those who administer justice to shut their eyes to serious
1986) (holding that termination of plaintiff's employment was not extreme or outrageous
conduct); Brownv Loudoun Golf& Country Club, Inc., 573 F Supp. 399, 405 (E.D. Va.
1983) (holding that alleged racial discrimination did not, as a matter of law, offend generally
accepted standards of decency or morality); Johnson v. McKee Baking Co., 398 F Supp.
201, 208 (W.D. Va. 1975) (holding that defendant's visit to plaintiff in hospital did not
constitute outrageous and intolerable conduct), aff'd, 532 F.2d 750 (4th Cir. 1976). But see
Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 562 (4th Cir. 1987) (overturning district court's
ruling that defendant's sexual harassment did not constitute outrageous conduct as matter of
Virginia law and remanding for trial); Foretich v Glamour, 753 F Supp. 955, 970 (D.D.C.
1990) (finding under Virginia law that magazine's publication of child custody dispute was
not outrageous in one respect and presented jury question in another respect); Welch v.
Kennedy Piggly Wiggly Stores, Inc., 63 B.R. 888, 895-96 (W.D. Va. 1986) (holding that
employer's termination of plaintiff did not constitute outrageous conduct, but that employer's
interference with plaintiffs right to unemployment compensation presented jury question as
to outrageousness); Morganv American Family Life Assurance Co., 559 F Supp. 477,482
(W.D Va. 1983) (finding that plaintiff's allegations of bad faith in defendant's refusal to pay
claim presented jury question as to outrageousness); Moore v. Allied Chem. Corp., 480 F
Supp. 364, 369-70 (E.D. Va. 1979) (finding that defendant's failure to warn of effects of
Kepone presented question for fact-finder as to outrageousness).
56. Womack, 210 S.E.2d at 148 (citing RESTATEmENT, supra note 48, § 46 cmt. h);
see Fahnngerv Bohte (In re Victor Distrib. Co.), 11 B.R. 242,250 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981)
(finding that determination of four elements is question of fact). But see Lewis v First Nat'l
Bank, 645 F Supp. 1499, 1506 (W.D. Va. 1986) (finding that plaintiff's proof failed as
matter of law to establish any of four elements), aff'd, 818 F.2d 861 (4th Cir. 1987).
57 Womack, 210 S.E.2d at 148.
58. Id. at 149.
59. Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961).
60. For furtherdiscussionofBowles v. May, 166 S.E. 550 (Va. 1932), see supranotes
23-37 and accompanying text.
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wrongs and let them go without being brought to account."61 However, the
Samms court noted that the Restatement test provided a realistic safeguard
against false claims.' Similarly, the Womack court explained that the
Restatement test's threshold determination of outrageousness limited
frivolous suits and avoided litigation in situations "where only bad manners
and mere hurt feelings are involved."I Thus, although physical injury is
no longer necessary to recover damages for intentionally inflicted emotional
distress in Virginia, Womack's outrageousness standard serves the similar
purpose of eliminating fraudulent claims.'
Although courts use the outrageousness requirement most frequently
to ensure the genuineness of emotional distress claims,' the requirement
of severe emotional distress serves the same purpose.' In Russo v
White, 6' the plaintiff, Patricia Russo, received hundreds of "hang-up"
telephone calls between April 1987 and January 1988.' With the help of
the police and the telephone company, Russo learned that the defendant,
Burton White, had been making the calls, some of which he made while
watching Russo's house.' As a result of these calls, Russo claimed to have
61. Samms, 358 P.2d at 347; see Bowles, 166 S.E. at 557 (acknowledging that
possibility of recovery for false claim should not preclude recovery for valid clai).
62. Samms, 358 P.2d at 347; see Bowles, 166 S.E. at 557 (establishing test with clear-
and-convincing evidence standard to prevent recovery m doubtful case).
63. Womack, 210 S.E.2d at 148; see RESTATEmENT, supra note 48, § 46 cmt. d
(establishing outrageousness standard as hurdle to recovery for "mere insults, indignities,
threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities").
64. Compare Bowles, 166 S.E. at 557 (stating that requirement of clear and convincing
proof of physical injury limits fraudulent claims) with Womack, 210 S.E.2d at 148 (stating
that outrageousness standard will limit frivolous claims).
65. See Danel Givelber, The Right to Mimmum Social Decency and the Limits of
Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82
COLUM. L. REv 42, 46 (1982) (asserting that outrageousness requirement of Restatement
§ 46 limits reach of tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and dominates proof of
its elements).
66. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 48, § 46 cmt. k (noting that physical injury serves
as proof of genuineness of claim and concluding that proof of physical injury is not necessary
if plaintiff can show severity of emotional distress).
67 400 S.E.2d 160 (Va. 1991).
68. Russo v. White, 400 S.E.2d 160, 161 (Va. 1991) (4-3 decision).
69. Id.
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suffered severe emotional distress, manifested by nervousness, sleeplessness,
"stress and its physical symptoms," and lack of concentration at work.70
Russo sued White for intentionally inflicted emotional distress, but the trial
court sustained the defendant's demurrer to the pleadings.
The Supreme Court of Virginia, holding that Russo failed to allege
severe emotional distress sufficient to satisfy the fourth prong of the Womack
test, affirmed. 2 The court noted that liability for intentionally inflicted
emotional distress arises only when the distress is so severe that "no
reasonable person could be expected to endure it. " The court then held
that Russo's alleged nervousness, sleeplessness, stress, and inattention did
not rise to that level.74 In support of its holding, the court noted that Russo
did not claim any objective physical injury, did not seek medical care, and
was not confined at home or in a hospital.75
The dissent in Russo, disagreeing with the majority's conclusion that
the plaintiff failed to satisfy Womack's requirement of severe emotional
distress, stated that no reasonable person could or should be expected to
endure the distress that Russo suffered. 76 Furthermore, the dissent took
issue with the majority's observation that Russo alleged no objective physical
injury I In the dissent's view, allegations of physical injury were unneces-
sary because "physical injury is not an element required to establish the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. "78
Whether or not physical injury is necessary for recovery-and the
Restatement explicitly states that it is not79-Russo illustrates that the
requirement of severe emotional distress is a significant hurdle for plaintiffs
70. Id. at 161-62.
71. Id. at 162.
72. Id. at 163.
73. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 48, § 46 cmt. j).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 164 (Hassell, J., dissenting).
77 Id.
78. Id.
79. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 48, § 46 cmt. k (noting that Restatement test does
not require proof of bodily harm to maintain cause of action for intentionally inflicted
emotional distress).
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to overcome before a jury will hear their emotional distress claims.' This
hurdle also prevents fraudulent or spurious claims.81 Thus, Womack's
outrageousness and severity requirements ensure the genuineness of
intentionally inflicted emotional distress claims, just as the clear-and-
convincing evidentiary standard of Bowles' had done prior to Womack.'
B. Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress
The first Virginia decision to address the issue of negligently
inflicted emotional distress was Connelly v. Western Union Telegraph Co.'4
In Connelly, the telegraph company failed to deliver promptly a telegram
informing the plaintiff that his father had died.' Because of the company's
tardiness, Connelly was absent from his father's funeral."5 Connelly filed
suit claiming damages for the grief and mental anguish the defendant's
negligence caused him, but the trial court granted the defendant's demur-
rer.
87
In affirming the demurrer, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
adopted the English rule of negligently inflicted emotional distress:'
"[M]ental anguish and suffering resulting from mere negligence, unaccompa-
nied with injuries to the person, cannot be made the basis for an action for
80. See id. § 46 cmt. j (stating that trial judge determines "whether on the evidence
severe emotional distress can be found" and that jury determines "whether, on the evidence,
it has m fact existed").
81. See id. § 46 cmt. k (noting that physical injury serves as proof of genuineness of
claim and concluding that proof of physical injury is not necessary if plaintiff can show
severity of emotional distress).
82. See Bowles v May, 166 S.E. 550, 557 (Va. 1932) (adopting clear-and-convincing
standard for emotional distress clains). For further discussion of Bowles, see supra notes 23-
37 and accompanying text.
83. c. Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 831 (Va. 1982) (stating that Womack
requirements serve to discourage spurious claims).
84. 40 S.E. 618 (Va. 1902).
85. Connelly v Western Umon Tel. Co., 40 S.E. 618, 619 (Va. 1902).
86. Id.
87 Id.
88. Id. at 619-20. The Connelly court relied specifically upon Lynch v. Knight, 11
Eng. Rep. 854 (H.L. 1861), wluch in turn relied upon Allsop v. Allsop, 157 Eng. Rep. 1292
(Ex. 1860). Connelly, 40 S.E. at 619-20.
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damages. "89 Because Connelly alleged no physical injury, the court upheld
the trial court's dismissal.' In doing so, the court recognized the difficulty
that most courts face in determining the scope of the damages in emotional
distress cases:
The injunes in such cases are too hard to determne with any
reasonable certainty, are more often assumed than real, and the
suit too liable to be wholly speculative. If every one was allowed
damages for injuries to Ins feelings caused by some one else, the
chief business of mankind might be fighting each other in the
courts.
91
Thus, the primary policy considerations behind Connelly's physical injury
requirement are the prevention of fraudulent claims of emotional distress and
the fear of a massive influx of litigation.'
89. Connelly, 40 S.E. at 620; see Soldinger v. United States, 247 F Supp. 559, 560
(E.D. Va. 1965) (referring to well-settled rule that no plaintiff may recover for negligently
inflicted mental anguish absent contemporaneous physical injury or willful and wanton
conduct); Hermanv. EasternAirlines, Inc., 149 F Supp. 417,422 (E.D.N.Y 1957) (finding
that Virginia law requires that actuai physical injury accompany mental anguish); Alexander
v Western Union Tel: Co., 126 F 445, 445 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1903) (holding under settled
Virginia law that damages for mental anguish alone were not recoverable); Tyler v Western
UmonTel. Co., 54 F 634,635 (C.C.W.D. Va. 1893) (finding no departure mVirgtna from
common-law doctrine that damages for mental suffering were allowed only when resulting
from physical injury); Carstensen v. Chnsland Corp., 442 S.E.2d 660, 668 (Va. 1994)
(refusing recovery for emotional distress absent accompanying physical harm or wanton and
willful conduct); Awtrey v Norfolk & W Ry., 93 S.E. 570, 572 (Va. 1917) (allowing no
recovery for mental anguish unaccompanied by actionable physical or pecumary damage);
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Tinsley, 82 S.E. 732, 733 (Va. 1914) (disallowing recovery of
damages for mental anguish and suffering from mere negligence unaccompamed by physical
injuries).
90. Connelly, 40 S.E. at 624.
91. Id. at 621 (quoting Francis v Western Union Tel. Co., 59 N.W 1078, 1082
(Minn. 1894) (Canty, J., concurring)). The Connelly court did acknowledge, however, that
a plaintiff may recover for emotional injunes, such as pam and suffering, arising from
negligently caused physical injury because "such mental suffering is necessarily a part of the
physical injury, and inseparable therefrom." Id. at 619 (citing Norfolk & W Ry. v.
Marpole, 34 S.E. 462 (Va. 1899)).
92. Id. at 621; see Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222, 226 (P.C.
1888) (noting that physical injury requirement serves to prevent imaginary claims of
negligently inflicted emotional distress).
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Virginia courts left the Connelly rule untouched until the supreme
court's 1973 decision in Hughes v Moore.' In that case, Toy Hughes
negligently drove his automobile into the front porch of Sue Etta Moore's
house.' Although Mrs. Moore suffered no physical injuries during the
accident, immediately afterwards she was physically unable to breast-feed
her infant and experienced an excessive and irregular menstrual flow I
Mrs. Moore filed suit seeking damages for the emotional distress she
suffered from having witnessed the car crash into her home.' The jury
awarded her $12,000.
In affirming the jury award, the Supreme Court of Virginia first
looked to its discussion of the recovery of emotional distress damages in
Bowles. In dicta, the Bowles court had reiterated the Connelly rule for
recovery of damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress: "[I]t seems
settled in Virginia that there can be no recovery for mental anguish and
suffering resulting from negligence unaccompanied by contemporaneous
physical injuries to the person."' The Hughes court adopted this physical
injury requirement, but added the requirement that the plaintiff prove by
clear and convincing evidence a causal connection between the defendant's
negligence, the emotional distress, and the subsequent physical injury 100
Because Mrs. Moore suffered a physical injury as a result of fright that the
defendant's negligence caused and because Hughes did not appeal the jury
93. 197 S.E.2d 214 (Va. 1973).




98. See id. at 216-17 (discussing Bowles). For further discussion of Bowles v May,
166 S.E. 550 (Va. 1932), se supra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.
99. Bowles, 166 S.E. at 555.
100. Hughes, 197 S.E.2d at 219. The Hughes court stated only that it sought to clarify
the rule expressed m Bowles. Id. However, Bowles applied the clear-and-convincing
evidentiary standard only to claims of intentionally inflicted emotional distress, leaving
untouched the Connelly court's formulation of the rule for negligently inflicted emotional
distress. See Bowles, 166 S.E. at 555 (citing Connelly court's requirement of physical injury
for recovery of negligently inflicted emotional distress); d. at 557 (applying clear-and-
convincing evidentiary standard to plaintiff's claim of intentionally inflicted emotional
distress).
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instruction requiring the plaintiff to prove her case by only a preponderance
of the evidence, the court upheld the jury verdict in her favor.1"'
In reaching its conclusion, the Hughes court examined prevailing
trends in emotional distress law in other American jurisdictions and in
England.' ° In response to the defendant's argument that Mrs. Moore
could not recover damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress absent
proof of some physical impact on her, the court noted that the two leading
cases requiring physical impact no longer represented valid law in their
respective jurisdictions."(n More significantly, the court discarded as
outmoded the rationale behind the impact rule."es Three policy consid-
erations had supported that rule: (1) the difficulty in proving causation
between the emotional distress and the physical injury; (2) the fear of
fraudulent or exaggerated claims; and (3) the fear of a "flood of litigation"
absent such a rule. 5 The Hughes court repudiated each rationale in turn:
(1) advances in medical science minimized the difficulty in determining
causation; (2) the possibility of fraudulent or exaggerated claims should not
prohibit those plaintiffs with legitimate claims from stating a cause of action;
and (3) courts should not shirk their duties simply because of an unproven
possibility of an increase i litigation.
The Hughes court stated that the fear of fraudulent or exaggerated
claims was no longer a valid reason to require proof of physical impact.I"
Nevertheless, that court established a difficult standard for plaintiffs alleging
negligently inflicted emotional distress by demanding proof of physical
juryes-a requirement that Connelly recognized as preventing specula-
101. Hughes, 197 S.E.2d at 220-21.
102. Id. at 217-18.
103. Id., see Battalla v State, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730 (N.Y 1961) (overruling Mitchell
v Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y 1896)); Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669, 681
(1901) (abandoning VictonanRys. Comm'rs v Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888)); see
also Peick v Mirro, 189 F Supp. 947, 949 (E.D. Va. 1960) (stating that Virginia courts
never required proof of physical impact to state cause of action for negligently inflicted
emotional distress).
104. Hughes, 197 S.E.2d at218-19.
105. Id. at 218.
106. Id. at 218-19.
107 Id.
108. Id. at 219.
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tive claims. 9  Similarly, Hughes's clear-and-convincing evidentiary
standard ensures the genuineness of negligently inflicted emotional distress
claims." 0
Although many jurisdictions have abandoned the physical injury
requirement in actions for negligently inflicted emotional distress,'1 '
Virginia still preserves that requirement."' In Naccash v Burger,"'
however, the Supreme Court of Virginia confronted a case in which the
plaintiffs alleged no physical injury-and no physical impact-in support of
their claim for damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress."4 In
109. Connelly v Western Union Tel. Co., 40 S.E. 618, 621 (Va. 1902).
110. See Bowles v. May, 166 S.E. 550, 557 (Va. 1932) (establishing clear-and-
convincing evidentiary standard for recovery for intentionally inflicted emotional distress and
reasoning that higher standard would prevent recovery in doubtful cases).
111. See KEnTON ET AL., supra note 1, § 54, at 364-65 (noting that several courts
allowed cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional distress absent proof of physical
injury); Scott D. Marrs, Mind over Body: Trends Regarding the Physical Injury Requirement
in Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress'and "Fear of Disease" Cases, 28 ToRT & INs.
L.J. 1, 2 (1992) (listing 14 jurisdictions that have abolished physical injury requirement).
112. See Ney v Landmark Educ. Corp., No. 92-1979, 1994 WL 30973, at *4 (4th Cir.
Feb. 2, 1994) (per cunam) (acknowledging that Virginia law expressly requires that physical
injury accompany claim of damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress); Ball v Joy
Technologies, Inc., 958 F.2d 36, 38 (4th Cir. 1991) (same), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 876
(1992); Sypert v. United States, 559 F Supp. 546, 548 (D.D.C. 1983) (refusing recovery
under Virginia law of negligently inflicted emotional distress because plaintiff suffered no
physical injury); Carstensen v Chnsland Corp., 442 S.E.2d 660, 668 (Va. 1994) (refusing
recovery for emotional distress because plaintiff failed to allege physical injury); see also E1-
Meswan v Washington Gas Light Co., 785 F.2d 483, 488-89 (4th Cir. 1986) (refusing to
allow cause of action for emotional distress caused by witnessing defendant's negligence
toward third party absent proof of some physical injury to plaintiff); cf. Myseros v Sissler,
387 S.E.2d 463, 466 (Va. 1990) (finding that Hughes decision required clear and convincing
evidence of manifestations of physical injury, not manifestations of emotional disturbance).
In Myseros, the plaintiff claimed to have suffered dizziness, nausea, sleeplessness, difficulty
mbreathing, chest pain, hypertension, unstable angina, marked ischemia, weight and appetite
loss, and problems with the heart muscle, all as an alleged result of a collision between his
truck and a drunk driver's car. Id. at 465. The court nonetheless denied him recovery for
emotional distress on the grounds that those ailments were symptoms of emotional distress,
not manifestations of physical injury. Id. at 466; see Ney, 1994 WL 30973, at *6 (reiterating
holding of Myseros that symptoms of emotional harm do not satisfy physical injury
requirement).
113. 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982).
114. Naccash v Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 830 (Va. 1982).
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that case, Edmund Naccash, a physician, negligently failed to discover that
the Burgers' unborn child had Tay-Sachs disease." 5 The parents sued
Naccash for damages for the emotional distress that they suffered as a result
of witnessing the child's deteriorating condition. 6 The jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiffs in excess of $180,000.17
Although the plaintiffs claimed no physical injury as a result of their
emotional distress, the Naccash court allowed recovery for tis negligently
inflicted distress.' Stating that "the circumstances of this case justify
another exception" to the traditional rule requiring physical injury, the court
explained that its previous decisions imposed restrictions on recovery in
order to discourage spurious or fraudulent claims. 19 Because of the
special circumstances in Naccash-negligence m prenatal care-the court
reasoned that no doubt could exist that the plaintiffs' emotional distress was
genuine. Therefore, the court affirmed the jury's verdict for the
plaintiffs.1 '
Naccash represents a significant departure from established Virginia
case law In no previous case had the Virginia court allowed recovery for
negligently inflicted emotional distress absent some physical injury
manifesting that distress.' In the twelve years since Naccash, cases that
have relied upon that decision in allowing emotional distress damages
without proof of physical injury have all arisen in the context of negligence
in prenatal care or in childbirth.' In 1990, the Supreme Court of
115. Id. at 827
116. Id. at 826-27
117 Id. at 827
118. Id. at 831.
119. Id.
120. Id., see Marrs, supra note 111, at 1 (noting that many jurisdictions that adhere to
physical injury requirement create exception when circumstances of claim guarantee
genuineness).
121. Naccash, 290 S.E.2d at 833.
122. See Hughes v. Moore, 197 S.E.2d 214, 219 (Va. 1973) (requiring physical injury
causally connected to defendant's negligence m order for plaintiff to recover).
123. See Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1198 (4th Cir. 1989) (allowing father of child
bornwith birth defects to recover for emotional distress under exception created mNaccash);
McIntyre v. Schick, 795 F Supp. 777, 782 (E.D. Va. 1992) (same).
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Virginia explicitly confined the holding of Naccash to its particular
facts.' Despite this limitation, the reasoning behind the decision-the
belief that the plaintiffs' claims were indisputably genuine-is important in
considering the policies behind Virginia law concerning the recovery of
damages for emotional distress and the application of those policies to AIDS-
phobia cases. 12
C. Proof of Genuineness: The Common Thread in
Virginia's Emotional Distress Case Law
Virginia's emotional distressjurisprudence has changed significantly
in the last twenty-five years. In the area of intentionally inflicted emotional
distress, Womack" introduced the possibility that a plaintiff could recover
emotional distress damages absent proof of any physical injury resulting
from or accompanying the emotional distress. 7  Although Russo"
subsequently suggested that a physical injury requirement might still
exist," 9 the Womack test's requirements of outrageousness and severe
emotional distress fulfill the same purpose as did the physical injury
requirement-ensuring the genuineness of emotional distress claims." 3
The Virginia Supreme Court's development of a cause of action for
negligently inflicted emotional distress also illustrated the court's desire to
124. Myseros v Sissier, 387 S.E.2d 463, 464 n.2 (Va. 1990); see Ney v Landmark
Educ. Corp., No. 92-1979, 1994 WL 30973, at *4 (4th Cir. Feb. 2, 1994) (per cunam)
(rejecting plaintiff's attempt to apply Naccash holding to facts of her case because Virginia
Supreme Court explicitly had confined Naccash to its facts); Timms v Rosenblum, 713 F
Supp. 948,955 (E.D. Va. 1989) (finding Naccash to be suz genens), affl'd, 900 F.2d 256 (4th
Cir. 1990). But see McIntyre, 795 F Supp. at 782 & n.10 (ignonng limitation placed on
Naccash and finding that facts before court fit into Naccash exception).
125. See infra notes 276-314 and accompanying text (discussing policy reasons behind
AIDS-phobia decisions).
126. For further discussion of Womack v Eldndge, 210 S.E.2d 145 (Va. 1974), see
supra notes 38-64 and accompanying text.
127 Womack, 210 S.E.2d at 148.
128. For further discussion of Russo v. White, 400 S.E.2d 160 (Va. 1991), see supra
notes 67-83 and accompanying text.
129. Russo, 400 S.E.2d at 163.
130. See Naccash v Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 831 (Va. 1982) (stating that Womack
requirements serve to discourage spurious claims).
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prevent fraudulent or spurious claims.131  Hughes" erected two hurdles
to recovery-physical injury and clear and convincing proof of a causal
connection-both of which ensure that spurious claims of emotional distress
will not reach the jury 131 However, Naccash1 4 allowed recovery for
negligently inflicted emotional distress despite the plamtiffs' inability to
allege physical injury 135 The Naccash court reasoned that the physical
injury requirement was unnecessary in that case, because the court found the
Burgers' claim to be indisputably genuine. 136  Once the court had found
some guarantee of genuineness, it asserted that denying recovery solely
because the plaintiffs had not shown some physical injury "would constitute
a perversion of fundamental principles of justice."137
The need to ensure the genuineness of emotional distress claims
consistently drives Virginia's emotional distress case law Similarly, the
fear of fraudulent or spurious claims plays a significant role in AIDS-phobia
cases. 131 Most jurisdictions that have addressed the AIDS-phobia issue
have erected hurdles to ensure the genuineness of such claims, often drawing
those standards from well-established emotional distress case law 139 By
131. See Connelly v. Western Umon Tel. Co., 40 S.E. 618, 621 (Va. 1902) (stating that
requirement of physical inJury discourages speculative claims of negligently inflicted
emotional distress).
132. For further discussion of Hughes v Moore, 197 S.E.2d 214 (Va. 1973), see supra
notes 93-110 and accompanying text.
133. Hughes, 197 S.E.2d at 219; see Naccash, 290 S.E.2d at 831 (stating that Hughes
requirements serve to discourage spurious claims).
134. Forfurtherdiscussion ofNaccashv. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982), see supra
notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
135. Naccash, 290 S.E.2d at 831.
136. Id.
137 Id. (quoting Berman v Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 15 (N.J. 1979)).
138. See mnfra notes 141-275 and accompanying text (discussing policy underlying
illustrative AIDS-phobia decisions).
139. See, e.g., Faya v Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 337-39 (Md. 1993) (applying
Maryland's physical injury requirement to AIDS-phobia claim); Ordway v County of
Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1016-17 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (applying New York's requirement
of guarantee of genuineness of emotional distress to AIDS-phobia claim); Johnson v. West
Va. Umv Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 892 (W Va. 1991) (applying West Virgima's
physical injury requirement to AIDS-phobia claim); see also Lamn, supra note 6, at 81-87
(analyzing trends in law of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress as
background for discussion of AIDS-phobia cases); Harry H. Lipsig, AIDS Phobia and
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adhering to the policy behind its own emotional distress jurisprudence,
Virginia also will ensure the validity of any AIDS-phobia claims that may
arise. 140
III. AIDS-Phobia Cases in Other Jurisdictions
A. Intentionally Inflicted Emotional Distress
Several jurisdictions that have adopted the Restatement section 46
test have applied that test in AIDS-phobia cases m which plaintiffs sought
damages for intentionally inflicted emotional distress.14' For example, in
J.B. v. Bohonovsky,142 the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey considered whether a plaintiff could recover damages under New
Jersey law for the fear of contracting AIDS." The plaintiff in Bohonov-
sky began having sexual relations with the defendant in January 1986.'"
By the summer of that year, the defendant had tested positive for HIV,
which developed into AIDS by the winter of 1987-88.14s The relationship
between the plaintiff and the defendant continued until July 1990, but the
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, N.Y L.J., Mar. 26, 1992, at 3, 3-4 (discussing
New York law of negligently inflicted emotional distress as background for discussion of New
York AIDS-phobia cases); Hams J. Zakarin, Comment, Scared to Death: A Cause ofAction
for AIDS Phobia, 10 TouRo L. REv 263, 267-75 (1993) (same).
140. See infra notes 276-314 and accompanying text (arguing that Virginia should apply
Womack test to AIDS-phobia plaintiff's claim of intentionally inflicted emotional distress and
should require proof of physical injury or actual eposure to AIDS for AIDS-phobia
plaintiff's claim of negligently inflicted emotional distress); see also James C. Maroulis,
Note, Can HIV-Negative Plaintiffs Recover Emotional Distress Damages for Their Fear of
AIDS?, 62 FoRDHAM L. REv 225, 250-51 (1993) (asserting that policy arguments behind
limitation of recovery of emotional distress damages apply equally to AIDS-phobia cases).
141. See Baranowski v. Torre, No. CV90-0236178, 1991 WL 240460, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 1991) (applying Restatement test to claim of intentionally inflicted
emotional distress m which plaintiff asserted that defendant-his former homosexual
partner-concealed AIDS-related cause of death of defendant's previous partner); Whelanv
Whelan, 588 A.2d 251, 252 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991) (applying Restatement test to wife's
claim of intentionally inflicted emotional distress arising from husband's false statement that
he had tested positive for AIDS).
142. 835 F Supp. 796 (D.N.J. 1993).
143. J.B. v Bohonovsky, 835 F Supp. 796, 797 (D.N.J. 1993).
144. Id. at 798.
145. Id.
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plaintiff did not discover that his partner had AIDS until September of that
year, one month before his partner's death. 46 Despite having tested
negative for HIV five times between 1988 and 1992, the plaintiff sued the
defendant's estate seeking damages for intentionally inflicted emotional
distress. 47
In granting the estate's motion for summary judgment, the district
court quoted the necessary elements for stating a claim of intentionally
inflicted emotional distress in New Jersey- "[T]he plaintiff must establish
intentional and outrageous conduct by the defendant, proximate cause, and
distress that is severe."'" The court found that the plaintiff failed to
satisfy this test, based on section 46 of the Restatement, 49 because the
plaintiff did not prove that he had suffered severe emotional distress."5
The court stated that the evidence that the plaintiff offered was insufficient
as a matter of law to support a finding that the plaintiff's emotional distress
was so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.
15'
The requirement that the plaintiff's emotional distress be severe ensured the
genuineness of the claim-a policy consideration that applies not only in
AIDS-phobia cases, but also to any claim of intentionally inflicted emotional
distress.' 2
146. Id.
147 Id. at 798-99; cf. Hosford v. Estate of Campbell, 708 F Supp. 7, 8-9 (D.D.C.
1989) (dismissing, under District of Columbia's Dead Man Statute, AIDS-phobia plaintiff's
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress asserted against estate of former
homosexual partner).
148. Bohonovsky, 835 F Supp. at 800 (quoting Buckley v Trenton Say. Fund Soc'y,
544 A.2d 857, 863 (N.J. 1988)); see Womackv. Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1974)
(allowing recovery for intentionally inflicted emotional distress if defendant's conduct was
intentional or reckless, conduct was outrageous and intolerable, causal connection existed
between conduct and distress, and emotional distress was severe).
149. See Buckley v Trenton Sav. Fund Soc'y, 544 A.2d 857, 863 (N.J. 1988) (basing
cause of action for intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Restatement § 46).
150. Bohonovsky, 835 F Supp. at 802.
151. Id., see RESTATMENT, supranote 48, § 46 cmt.j (requirmgthat emotionaldistress
be so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it).
152. See Russo v White, 400 S.E.2d 160, 163 (Va. 1991) (affirming dismissal of claim
of intentionally inflicted emotional distress on grounds that plaintiff failed to allege
sufficiently severe emotional distress).
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In K.A.C. v. Benson,153 the Court of Appeals of Minnesota also
addressed a claim for intentionally inflicted emotional distress arising from
the fear of contracting AIDS." The plaintiffs were former patients of an
AIDS-infected physician, Philip Benson, who allegedly exposed the plaintiffs
to the AIDS virus by performing "invasive gynecological procedures" while
he suffered from "weeping exudative sores. "155 The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendant conducted these procedures despite instructions from the
Minnesota Board of Medical Examiners (Board) that he cease such
procedures once he developed oozing sores.156 Benson responded to this
allegation by stating that the Board had instructed him not to perform
"invasive surgical procedures. "' Although the plaintiffs had tested
negative for HIV, each sought damages for intentionally and negligently
inflicted emotional distress."'8 The trial court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment on the claim of intentionally inflicted
emotional distress. 59
In an unpublished decision reversing the trial court, the court of
appeals first noted that Minnesota courts recognize a cause of action for
intentionally inflicted emotional distress: "[A] plaintiff must show that
(1) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct was intentional
or reckless; (3) the conduct caused emotional distress; and (4) the distress
was severe."" Citing the discrepancy between the litigants' versions of
the Board's instructions to Benson, the court held that a genuine issue of
153. Nos. C6-93-1203, C5-93-1306, C4-93-1328, 1993 WL 515825 (Minn. Ct. App.
Dec. 14, 1993).
154. K.A.C. v. Benson, Nos. C6-93-1203, C5-93-1306, C4-93-1328,1993WL 515825,
at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1993), review granted, (Minn. Feb. 24, 1994).
155. Id. at *1-2.
156. Id. at *2.
157 Id.
158. Id. at *1.
159. Id. The trialcourt also granted Dr. Benson's motionfor summary judgment onthe
plaintiffs' claims of negligently inflicted emotional distress. Id. The court of appeals,
reversing, held that proof of actual exposure to the virus was unnecessary for recovery and
that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Dr. Benson had placed his patients
in the "zone of danger" of contracting HIV Id. at *4.
160. Id. at *2 (citing Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 438-39
(Minn. 1983)); see Womack v Eldndge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1974) (requirmg same
elements as Hubbard).
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material fact existed as to whether the defendant's conduct was extreme and
outrageous.' The court therefore remanded the issue for trial."
The importance of Benson and Bohonovsky 63 lies in the readiness
with which both courts applied the Restatement test for a claim of intention-
ally inflicted emotional distress." Although neither Benson nor Bohonov-
sky cites section 46, the Minnesota and New Jersey courts previously had
adopted the Restatement test for claims of intentionally inflicted emotional
distress. 65 Because the Supreme Court of Virginia adopted the same test
in Womack v Eldridge," Virginia courts should agree with the Benson
and Bohonovsky courts that a claim for intentionally inflicted emotional
distress in an AIDS-phobia case is in substance no different from any other
cause of action for intentionally inflicted emotional distress. The Womack
test would ensure the genuineness of AIDS-phobia claims just as it
discourages spurious claims of other forms of emotional distress."
161. Benson, 1993 WL 515825, at *2; see Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v Sheft, 989
F.2d 1105, 1106 (9th Cir. 1993) (describing proceedings m California state trial court in
which formerhomosexual partner of Rock Hudson recovered $14.5 million for fear of having
contracted AIDS; jury found Hudson's conduct outrageous enough to support claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress); Baranowskiv Torre, No. CV90-0236178, 1991
WL 240460, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 1991) (holding that defendant's concealment
of AIDS-related death of formerhomosexual partner constituted outrageous conduct sufficient
to support claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Whelanv Whelan, 588 A.2d
251, 253 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that husband's false statement that he had tested
positive for AIDS constituted outrageous conduct sufficient to support claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress).
162. Benson, 1993 WL 515825, at *2.
163. For further discussion of J.B. v Bohonovsky, 835 F Supp. 796 (D.N.J. 1993),
see supra notes 142-52 and accompanying text.
164. See Bohonovsky, 835 F Supp. at 800 (applying test nearly identical to that of
Restatement § 46); Benson, 1993 WL 515825, at *2 (same).
165. See Hubbard v United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Minn. 1983)
(adopting test explicitly based on Restatement § 46); Buckley v. Trenton Say Fund Soc'y,
544 A.2d 857, 863 (N.J. 1988) (same); Womack v Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va.
1974) (same).
166. 210 S.E.2d 145 (Va. 1974). For further discussion of Womack v Eldndge, 210
S.E.2d 145 (Va. 1974), see supra notes 38-64 and accompanying text.
167 See Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 831 (Va. 1982) (stating that Womack
requirements serve to discourage spurious claims).
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B. Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress
In evaluating AIDS-phobia claims seeking damages for negligently
inflicted emotional distress, many courts have based their decisions on well-
developed common-law principles of negligently inflicted emotional distress
applicable to their jurisdictions. 1" In Ordway v. County of Suffolk,"6
Craig Bradford Ordway, a surgeon, sued the County of Suffolk for what the
New York Supreme Court hearing the case characterized as the negligent
infliction of emotional distress." On November 28, 1989, Ordway
performed surgery on the wrist of a patient whom the Suffolk County Police
had arrested on charges of burglary 11 One week later, Ordway per-
168. See Burkv Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F Supp. 285, 286-87 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (noting
that Pennsylvania courts require proof of physical injury to recover for negligently inflicted
emotional distress and proof of actual exposure to disease-causing agent; finding that AIDS-
phobia plaintiff's loss of sexual function satisfied physical injury requirement, but that
plaintiff failed to show exposure); Poole v Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F Supp. 1367,
1371 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (noting thatIllinois courts refuse recovery for emotional distress absent
physical injury or illness and finding that AIDS-phobia plaintiff alleged no injury);
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Doe, 840 P.2d 288,292 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that Arizona
case law requires bodily injury as prerequisite for recovery for emotional distress and finding
that AIDS-phobia plaintiffs failed to establish physical harm), review denied, (Az. Dec. 1,
1992); McQuaig v. McLaughlin, 440 S.E.2d 499, 503 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that
Georgia case law requires physical injury as prerequisite for recovery for negligently inflicted
emotional distress and finding that plaintiffs alleged no cognizable injury); Vallery v
Southern Baptist Hosp., 630 So. 2d 861, 866-67 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that recovery
for claims of emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury is well established in
Louisiana case law, but requiring plaintiff to prove channel of infection to recover in AIDS-
phobia case), writ denied, 634 So. 2d 860 (La. 1994); K.A.C. v. Benson, Nos. C6-93-1203,
C5-93-1306, C4-93-1328, 1993 WL 515825, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1993) (noting
that Minnesota had abandoned impact rule in cases of negligently inflicted emotional distress
and that plaintiffs could recover upon proof that defendant's negligence placed them in zone
of danger of contracting HIV), review granted, (Minn. Feb. 24, 1994); Tischler v. Dimenna,
609 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1003-04, 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (noting that New York courts recognize
claims of emotional distress without physical injury and holding that plaintiff stated AIDS-
phobia claim despite failing to allege physical injury); cf. Doe v Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595,
598 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (noting reluctance of New York courts to grant emotional distress
damages in absence of contemporaneous physical injury and refusing to grant such damages
to AIDS-phobia plaintiff who failed to allege physical injury or actual exposure to virus).
169. 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
170. Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1015 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
171. Id.
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formed another operation on the patient.' Three days after the second
surgery, Ordway learned that the patient had tested positive for HIV for the
preceding four years.'73 Alleging that he would have protected himself
further had he known of the patient's condition, Ordway sought damages for
the severe emotional distress caused by his fear of having contracted AIDS
even though he had tested HIV-negative.174
The Supreme Court of Suffolk County granted the county's motion
for summary judgment.17 In doing so, the court briefly traced the
evolution in New York of the recoverability of damages for negligently
inflicted emotional distress. 76 Recognizing that New York courts at one
time required "attendant physical injuries" in order to ensure the genuineness
of claims for psychic m jury, 77 the court noted that plaintiffs in such cases
now have the burden of demonstrating some guarantee of genuineness
insuring the legitimacy of the claim.17 Such a showing often includes
some form of physical trauma, but any evidence establishing the validity of




175. Id. at 1018.
176. Id. at 1016; see Lipsig, supra note 139, at 3-4 (tracing history of New York law
of negligently inflicted emotional distress); Zakarin, supra note 139, at 267-75 (same).
177 Ordway, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1016 (citing Mitchell v Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354
(N.Y 1896)).
178. Id. (citing Battalla v State, 176 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y 1961)); see Neal v Neal, 873
P.2d 871, 876 (Idaho 1994) (requiring proof of reasonableness of fear of contracting AIDS
and genuineness of mental injury, but not addressing genuineness issue on ground that
plaintiff failed to demonstrate reasonableness); cf. Marriott v Sedco Forex Int'l Resources,
Ltd., 827 F Supp. 59, 75-76 (D. Mass. 1993) (allowing recovery for emotional distress in
AIDS-phobia case under Jones Act because itwas beyond doubt thatplaintiff suffered genuine
emotional distress); Castro v New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697-98 (Sup. Ct.
1991) (holding that guarantee of genuineness exists if AIDS-phobia plaintiff can tie claim of
emotional distress to distinct event and finding that proof of needle-stick suffices to guarantee
genuineness). But see Vallery v Southern Baptist Hosp., 630 So. 2d 861, 867 (La. Ct. App.
1993) (noting that plaintiff's fear of contracting AIDS may be genuine, but refusing recovery
of emotional distress damages absent proof of channel of exposure), writdented, 634 So. 2d
860 (La. 1994).
179. Ordway, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1016 (citing Lancellottiv. Howard, 547 N.Y.S.2d 654,
655 (App. Div 1989)).
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In applying this common-law standard to the facts in Ordway, the
court concluded that the plaintiff's claim for emotional damages was
insufficient as a matter of law " The court found no unusual occurrence
during the operations that would guarantee the genuineness of Ordway's
claim.18' Because Ordway did not allege any physical manifestations of
his emotional distress, the court could find no "physical trauma" sufficient
to support his claim."i Therefore, the court ruled that Ordway's claim
failed to clear the hurdle of genuineness," which the New York courts
had developed in order to prevent a plethora of vexatious, frivolous
lawsuits."
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia also relied on its
common law of negligently inflicted emotional distress in deciding an AIDS-
phobia case, Johnson v. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc."8 The
plaintiff, Lofton Johnson, was a police officer for the West Virginia
University Security Police." 6 On June 2, 1988, an unruly AIDS-infected
patient entered the university hospital." The patient disclosed his
condition to doctors and nurses, but when Johnson arrived thirty minutes
after the patient made that disclosure, no one informed the officer that the
patient had AIDS." During a struggle, the patient bit himself on the arm,
drawing his own blood into his mouth. 89 Moments later, the patient bit
Johnson on the arm as Johnson attempted to subdue him."9 After Johnson
180. Id. at 1017 ButseeLouiseH. Feffer,A1DSphobia, A New Entity, N.Y ST. B.J.,
Feb. 1993, at 14, 15 (arguing that New York courts should treat AIDS-phobia claims
differently from other emotional distress clains because of fatality of disease).
181. Ordway, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1016-17; see Zakarm, supra note 139, at 284-85
(interpreting Ordway to require actual exposure to AIDS to guarantee genuineness of AIDS-
phobia claim despite Ordway court's failure to discuss exposure issue).
182. Ordway, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1017
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1016.
185. 413 S.E.2d 889 (W Va. 1991).
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and others succeeded in restraining the patient, hospital personnel informed
Johnson that the patient had AIDS.19'
After this discovery, Johnson allegedly began to suffer from severe
emotional distress, which caused sleeplessness, loss of appetite, and other
physical ailments."9  His distress intensified after his wife's refusal to
have sexual relations with him and their eventual divorce. 1i Johnson
tested negative for AIDS. "9 He then sued the hospital for damages for his
emotional distress, and the jury awarded him $1.9 million."5
In affirming the trial court's refusal to set aside the verdict, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals noted first that a plaintiff under West
Virginia law could not recover damages for negligently inflicted emotional
distress absent physical injury " The court held that Johnson offered
sufficient evidence of physical injury- the bite that precipitated the lawsuit
and the physical manifestations of his emotional anguish (including
sleeplessness and loss of appetite)." 7 Thus, the plaintiff met the physical
injury requirement." s The court added another hurdle, however, by
191. Id.
192. Id. at 891-92.
193. Id. at 891 & n.2.
194. Id. at 891.
195. Id. at 891-92. The jury returned a verdict of $2 million in Johnson's favor, but
reduced that amount to $1.9 million because of Johnson's 5 % contributory negligence. Id.
at 892.
196. Id. at 892 (citing Monteleone v. Co-Operative Transit Co., 36 S.E.2d 475 (W Va.
1945)). But see Susan J. Zook, Case Note, 43 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMp L. 481, 490
(1993) (criticizing Johnson for adhering to outdated physical injury requirement). In 1992,
the West Virginia Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may recover for negligently inflicted
emotional distress without demonstrating physical injury if that plaintiff can show that his
claim for emotional distress damages is not spurious. Ricottilli v. Summersville Memorial
Hosp., 425 S.E.2d 629, 635 (W Va. 1992). The court recently ruled that fear-of-AIDS
claims are inherently genuine-not spunous-given the fact that AIDS is an invariably fatal
disease; therefore, the physical injury requirement no longer applies to AIDS-phobia claims
in West Virginia. Bramer v Dotson, 437 S.E.2d 773, 774-75 (W Va. 1993).
197 Johnson, 413 S.E.2d at 892.
198. Id., see Marchica v Long Island R.R., 810 F Supp. 445, 449 (E.D.N.Y 1993)
(holding that AIDS-phobia plaintiff in FELA action for emotional distress satisfied physical
injury requirement by proving thathypodernmic needle punctured skin of hand); Burk v Sage
Prods., Inc., 747 F Supp. 285, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (finding that AIDS-phobia plaintiff
sufficiently alleged physical injury by claiming loss of sexual function). But see Lubowitz
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requiring the plaintiff to prove that his fear of contracting AIDS was
reasonable.99
In discussing the reasonableness issue, the Johnson court became the
first state supreme court to address what has become the most contested issue
in AIDS-phobia cases: whether actual exposure to the virus is necessary for
the plaintiff to recover emotional distress damages. 2 ° After reviewing
three AIDS-phobia cases denying recovery because the alleged emotional
distress was too speculative,"m ' the court looked to two fear-of-cancer
v. Albert Einstein Medical Ctr., 623 A.2d 3, 4-5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (finding that AIDS-
phobia plaintiff failed to allege legally cognizable injury although plaintiff alleged nausea,
vomiting, and diarrhea as result of emotional distress).
199. Johnson, 413 S.E.2d at 893.
200. See Burk, 747 F. Supp. at 287-88 (requiring proof of actual exposure to AIDS virus
to recover emotional distress damages and finding that plaintiff failed to satisfy requirement);
Lopezv Leal, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 832,839 (Ct. App. 1994) (requiring proof of actual exposure
to AIDS virus m absence of proof of physical injury and finding that plaintiff failed to
establish exposure); Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 876 (Idaho 1994) (requiring proof of actual
exposure to AIDS virus to recover emotional distress damages and finding that plaintiff failed
to allege exposure); Vallery v Southern Baptist Hosp., 630 So. 2d 861, 867 (La. Ct. App.
1993) (requiring AIDS-phobia plaintiff to prove channel of infection to recover emotional
distress damages and remanding to trial court for determination of issue), writ denied, 632
So. 2d 860 (La. 1994); Lann, supra note 6, at 99 (concluding that courts should require
AIDS-phobia plaintiffs to demonstrate actual exposure); Maroulis, supra note 140, at 261
(same); see also Marriott v. Sedco Forex Int'l Resources, Ltd., 827 F Supp. 59, 74-76 (D.
Mass. 1993) (allowing recovery under Jones Act for emotional distress resulting from fear
of AIDS because plaintiff alleged direct exposure to HIV, but not explicitly requiring proof
of exposure for recovery); Barrett v Danbury Hosp., No. 31 00 46, 1994WL 76394, at *13
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 3, 1994) (refusing recovery for emotional distress resulting from fear
of AIDS because plaintiff's failure to prove exposure to disease-causing agent demonstrated
unreasonableness of fear, but not explicitly requiring proof of exposure for recovery);
Tischler v Dimenna, 609 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (allowing recovery for
emotional distress resulting from fear of AIDS because plaintiff proved probable exposure
to disease, but not explicitly requiring proof of exposure for recovery).
201. See Burk, 747 F Supp. at 288 (refusing recovery of emotional distress damages
for fear of contracting AIDS because plaintiff failed to prove actual exposure to virus); Hare
v State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (App. Div.) (affixming lower court's demal of damages for
emotional distress in AIDS-phobia case on ground that distress was speculative), appeal
denied, 580 N.E.2d 1058 (N.Y 1991); Doe v Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595, 599 (Sup. Ct. 1987)
(refusing recovery of emotional distress damages in AIDS-phobia case on ground that causal
connection was highly attenuated); see also Doe v. State, 588 N.Y.S.2d 698,705-06 (Ct. Cl.
1992) (refusing recovery of emotional distress damages in AIDS-phobia case because
defendant's negligence did not proximately cause plaintiff s emotional injury), modified, 595
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decisions.'m Based on these precedents, the court held that before the
plaintiff may recover emotional distress damages for fear of contracting a
disease such as AIDS, the plaintiff first must prove exposure to the
disease.' Proof of exposure serves to establish the reasonableness of the
plaintiff's fear.'m Because the hospital conceded that the unruly patient's
bite exposed Johnson to the AIDS virus and because Johnson proved a
sufficient physical injury, the court upheld the jury verdict in the plaintiff's
favor.25
In addition to the traditional physical injury requirement, the
Johnson court required proof of the reasonableness of the plaintiff's fear,
which the plaintiff could demonstrate through proof of actual exposure to the
AIDS virus.2' However, that court did not discuss the policy consid-
erations behind this added element. The Supreme Court of Tennessee
reached a similar conclusion after discussing the issue of actual exposure in
Carroll v Sisters of Saint Francis Health Services, Inc.' In that case,
N.Y.S.2d 592 (App. Div 1993); Petn v. Bank of N.Y Co., 582 N.Y.S.2d 608, 613-14
(Sup. Ct. 1992) (refusing emotional distress damages for fear of contracting AIDS on ground
that plaintiff's clan was too speculative).
202. Johnson, 413 S.E.2d at 893; see In re Moorenovich, 634 F Supp. 634, 637 (D.
Me. 1986) (holding that plaintiff may recover damages for fear of cancer if fear is
reasonable); Rittenhouse v St. Regis Hotel Joint Venture, 565 N.Y.S.2d 365, 367 (Sup. Ct.
1990) (denying damages for fear of cancer absent physical indication of disease), rev'd, 579
N.Y.S.2d 100 (App. Div 1992). But see Lan, supra note 6, at 94-95 (noting that fear-of-
AIDS plaintiff canundergo reliable tests to determine likelihood of having contracted AIDS,
whereas fear-of-cancer plaintiff cannot; criticizing Johnson court's failure to consider this
distinction).
203. Johnson, 413 S.E.2d at 893.
204. Id., see Neal v Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 876 (Idaho 1994) (holding that AIDS-phobia
plaintiff's fear is unreasonable as matter of law if plaintiff fails to present evidence
establishing actual exposure); Funeral Servs. by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community
Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79, 84 (W Va. 1991) (same).
205. Johnson, 413 S.E.2d. at 894. But see Goldberg, supra note 8, at 88 (criticizing
Johnson by noting that virtually every medical authority agrees that biting is not means of
spreading AIDS).
206. Johnson, 413 S.E.2d at 894. But see Zook, supra note 196, at 491-92 (criticizing
Johnson court's adoption of reasonableness standard and arguing that courts should base
recovery in AIDS-phobia suits on evidence of actual exposure and statistical likelihood of
contracting AIDS).
207 868 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1993).
746
AIDS-PHOBIA
Bessie Carroll visited her sister at St. Joseph Hospital in Memphis on June
21, 1988.' After washing her hands, Carroll reached up to what she
believed to be a paper towel dispenser.' Unable to extract a towel from
the bottom of the container, the plaintiff lifted the lid from the top, placed
her hand down inside the container, and immediately felt sharp pricks in
three of her fingers.21 She later discovered that she had pricked her
fingers on contaminated needles.2" Carroll immediately became fearful
of having contracted AIDS." A subsequent HIV test was negative, as
were five other HIV tests over a three-year period following the acci-
dent." 3 Carroll, nevertheless, filed suit against the hospital, seeking
damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress. 24
The trial court granted the hospital's motion for summary judgment,
but the court of appeals reversed." 5 The hospital argued on its appeal to
the supreme court that Tennessee case law in fear-of-disease cases mandated
that the plaintiff demonstrate actual exposure to the disease-causing
agent.21'6 Carroll interpreted the same case law to require only that the
plaintiff show "sufficient indicia of genuineness and reasonableness" to
support her fear of the disease.217 Carroll also argued that a requirement
of actual exposure would prejudice plaintiffs in AIDS-phobia cases such as
hers, in which the defendant had disposed of the only evidence capable of
proving exposure.218






213. Id. at 586-87
214. Id. at 587; cf. Cotita v. Pharma-Plast, U.S.A., Inc., 974 F.2d 598, 599 (5th Cir.
1992) (affirming jury verdict for plaintiff for emotional distress from fear of contracting
AIDS under facts similar to Carroll, but discussing only procedural issues).
215. Carroll, 868 S.W.2d at 587.
216. Id. at 589-90.
217 Id. at 590.
218. Id.
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The supreme court found weaknesses in both parties' arguments." 9
The hospital's argument relied on decisions in fear-of-cancer cases that the
court found "somewhat unsatisfying" because of the unique deadliness of
AIDS and the potentially long latency of HIV o The supreme court then
noted that courts that had adopted Carroll's argument often justified their
decisions on the gradual liberalization of the law of negligently inflicted
emotional distress, particularly the relaxation of the traditional physical
injury requirement."' The Carroll court disagreed with this approach for
two reasons.' First, the plaintiffs argument treated the issue of reason-
ableness in emotional distress cases in the same manner as in other areas of
negligence law, a treatment that the court viewed as problematic due to the
traditional reluctance of courts to allow juries to award damages based solely
upon subjective claims of emotional distress.'
The court's primary reason for rejecting the plaintiff's argument was
that her proposed reasonableness standard would remove the "objective
component" that Tennessee courts had deemed necessary to state a cause of
action for negligently inflicted emotional distress.' That objective
component often consisted of a demonstrable physical injury I However,
the court noted that in fear-of-disease cases under Tennessee law, courts
tended to allow such a cause of action upon a minimal showing of physical
injury 226 This weakening of the physical injury requirement did not,
however, signal the abandonment of the necessary objective component. 7
Because an objective component was still necessary to recover for negligent-
ly inflicted emotional distress, the court held that actual exposure to HIV
was a prerequisite for recovery of emotional distress damages in fear-of-
AIDS cases.' Because Carroll could not prove actual exposure to the
219. Id. at 592-93.
220. Id.





226. Id. (citing Laxton v Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982)).
227 Id.
228. Id. at 594.
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virus, the supreme court reinstated the trial court's entry of summary
judgment for the hospital. ' 9
At least one court has relied on the decision of the Tennessee Court
of Appeals in Carroll, which the Tennessee Supreme Court later re-
versed.' The Court of Appeals of Maryland in Faya v Almaraz23
adopted the reasonableness test for AIDS-phobia cases and explicitly rejected
the requirement of actual exposure to the virus.' In Faya, the defendant,
Rudolph Almaraz, discovered that he was HIV-positive in 1986.m3 On
October 7, 1988, Almaraz, a physician, performed a partial mastectomy on
one plaintiff, Sonja Faya, without first disclosing his infected status.' On
October 27, 1988, Almaraz developed an eye infection that is symptomatic
of AIDS." Eighteen days later, he surgically removed a benign lump
from the breast of the other plaintiff, Perry Mahoney Rossi, again without
disclosing his condition."S After Almaraz's death in late 1990, both
plaintiffs learned that Almaraz had operated on them while he was HIV-
positive. 7 Both took AIDS tests, which were negative."s
Faya and Rossi filed separate complaints against Almaraz's estate
seeking damages for emotional distress that the doctor's negligence
caused. 9 The trial court, granting the estate's motion to dismiss both
complaints, held that the plaintiffs failed to state a legally compensable
injury and failed to allege actual exposure to the disease-causing agent.24'
229. Id.
230. See Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health Servs., Inc., No. 02AOI-9110-CV-
00232, 1992 WL 276717, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1992) (allowing recovery of
emotional distress damages in AIDS-phobia case without proof of actual exposure to virus),
rev'd, 868 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1993).
231. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
232. Faya v Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 336-37 (Md. 1993).






239. Id. at 330.
240. Id.
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The court of appeals granted certiorari before the intermediate appellate
court heard the plaintiffs' appeal."'
In reversing the trial judge's dismissal, the court of appeals first
found that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action in negligence against
Almaraz for his failure to disclose his infected condition.' 2 Next, the
court considered whether allegations of actual exposure to the virus were
necessary for the plaintiffs to state a cause of action for fear of contracting
AIDS.'4 Relying primarily on the Tennessee Court of Appeals' decision
in Carroll, the Faya court adopted the test requiring an AIDS-phobia
plaintiff to demonstrate the reasonableness of a claim.' In rejecting the
actual exposure requirement, the court reasoned that requiring plaintiffs to
prove actual exposure would unfairly punish them for lacking the requisite
information to do so." s
In discussing the damages issue, the Faya court examined the
common law in Maryland concerning the recovery of damages for emotional
distress."6 The original rule in Maryland required a showing of physical
impact or injury in order to recover emotional distress damages.7
However, Maryland courts, like the courts in many jurisdictions, had
softened that rule so that a plaintiff could recover upon a showing of
objectively measurable injuries, a standard that allowed recovery despite no
medical diagnosis of any physical ailments." 8 In Faya, both plaintiffs
alleged headaches, sleeplessness, and the "physical and financial sting of
blood tests for the AIDS virus." 9 The court found these injuries to be
sufficient to allow recovery of damages for emotional distress,' but
241. Id. at 331.
242. Id. at 334; cf. Diaz Reyes v. United States, 770 F Supp. 58, 62-63 (D.P.R. 1991)
(holding that plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to establish hospital's negligent failure
to inform plaintiff's husband that he had AIDS), affd, 971 F.2d 744 (1 st Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 2306 (1992).
243. Faya, 620 A.2d at 335-36.
244. Id. at 336.
245. Id. at 336-37
246. Id. at 337-38.
247 Id. at 337 (citing Pennsylvania, B. & W R.R. v Mitchell, 69 A. 422 (Md. 1908)).
248. Id. at 338 (citing Vance v Vance, 408 A.2d 728 (Md. 1979)).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 338-39.
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limited the recovery to the time period between the plaintiffs' discovery of
Almaraz's illness and their receipt of HIV-negative test results." This
limitation allowed recovery only for fear and emotional distress during the
period constituting their "reasonable window of anxiety "2
The Second District of the California Court of Appeal adopted the
reasoning and result of the Faya decision in Kerins v Hartley I On
November 5, 1986, James Gordon, a surgeon, removed a uterine tumor
from plaintiff Jean Kerins.' Prior to that surgery, Kerins alleged that she
specifically asked Gordon whether he was in good health. 5 Kerins
alleged that Gordon's positive response to her question was deceitful in light
of the fact that Gordon was in a high-risk group for infection, had been
suffering from AIDS symptoms, and had recently undergone testing to
determine whether he was HIV-positiveY 6 Five days after Kerins's
surgery, Gordon received the results from his AIDS test, which indicated
that he was indeed HIV-positive.1 In April 1988, Kerins learned from
a televised press conference that Gordon had contracted AIDS." Kerins
took an AIDS test, which was negative." 9 Kerins sued Gordon, who died
in July 1990, for negligently inflicted emotional distress.2a
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the ground that Kerins's fear of AIDS was unreasonable as a
matter of law 261 The appellate court reversed.2" Gordon's estate ar-
gued to the appellate court that regardless of the genuineness of Kerins's
distress, the tort system should not bear the burden of purely speculative
251. Id.at 337
252. Id.
253. 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (Ct. App. 1993).
254. Kerins v Hartley, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 623 (Ct. App. 1993), vacated and
transferredfor reconsideration, 868 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1994).
255. Id. at 624.
256. Id.
257 Id. at 623.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 622.
261. Id. at 625.
262. Id. at 632-33.
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lawsuits and should not award compensation absent a reliable indicator that
the distress is reasonable.' The estate noted that a lesser standard would
place an unbearable strain on the overburdened judicial system by allowing
frivolous lawsuits in this context.26 4 The court, rejecting the estate's
argument, reasoned that a rule permitting recovery of emotional distress
damages in AIDS-phobia cases for the limited period of reasonable mental
anguish would protect the judicial system.21 The Kerins court then
adopted the "window of anxiety" standard that the Maryland court developed
in Faya.6 Thus, the Kerns court concluded that the fear of AIDS
becomes unreasonable as a matter of law only after the plaintiff has had
sufficient opportunity to determine with reasonable medical certainty that
there has been no actual exposure to or infection with the AIDS virus.2
Gordon's estate appealed to the Supreme Court of California, which granted
review 268
On February 24, 1994, the supreme court transferred review to the
court of appeal with directions to reconsider the case in light of Potter v
263. Id. at 631.
264. Id. at 631-32.
265. Id. at 632.
266. Id.
267 Id., see Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 810 F Supp. 445, 452 (E.D.N.Y 1993)
(leaving to trier of fact issue of whether AIDS-phobia plaintiff's emotional distress was
reasonable, but deeming fear unreasonable after plaintiff received last negative AIDS test
result); K.A.C. v Benson, Nos. C6-93-1203, C5-93-1306, C4-93-1328, 1993 WL 515825,
at *5-6 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1993) (following Kerins and Faya by limiting recovery of
emotional distress damages to period between discovery of possible exposure and return of
HIV-negative test results), review granted, (Minn. Feb. 24, 1994); Kaehne v Schmidt, No.
90-1108, 1991 WL 121030, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. May 15, 1991) (approving jury instruction
allowing jury to determine emotional distress damages for period between awareness of risk
of contracting AIDS and receipt of negative test results), review denied, 474 N.W.2d 107
(Wis. 1991); Maroulis, supra note 140, at 262-63 (arguing in favor of cutting off liability
after plaintiff receives negative test results); see also Tischler v Dimenna, 609 N.Y.S.2d
1002, 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (narrowing window of anxiety to period between exposure and
first reliable AIDS test); Lani, supra note 6, at 99-101 (arguing in favor of limiting AIDS-
phobia plaintiff's recovery to emotional distress suffered during six-month period after
exposure while HIV tests are inconclusive).
268. Kerns v. Hartley, 860 P.2d 1182, 1182 (Cal. 1993), transferredfor reconsidera-
lion, 868 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1994).
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Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,' the supreme court's recent fear-of-cancer
decisionY California's eventual position on the issue of actual exposure
undoubtedly will have an important effect on AIDS-phobia cases throughout
the country If California requires proof of actual exposure to the AIDS
virus, the view favoring that requirement, propounded in Johnson27' and
269. 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993). In Potter, the Supreme Court of California considered
the issue of whether a plaintiff could recover emotional distress damages for his fear of
developing cancer m the absence of physical injury or illness. Potter v Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 800 (Cal. 1993). The plaintiffs were landowners who lived
adjacent to a landfill into which the Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. dumped its waste. Id. at
801. Contrary to its agreement with the operators of the landfill, Firestone dumped liquid
waste into the landfill, including known and suspected human carcinogens, which eventually
contaminated the plaintiffs' water supply. Id. at 801-02. The plaintiffs filed suit against
Firestone, claiming damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress resulting from their
fear of developing cancer. Id. at 802. In addressing the issue of whether the plaintiffs could
recover emotional distress damages for fear-of-cancer absent proof of physical injury or
illness, the Potter court first noted that physical injury is not a prerequisite in Califorma for
recovering damages for serious emotional distress if some guarantee of the genuineness of the
claim exists. Id. at 808 (citing Burgess v Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1992)). To
establish this guarantee of genuineness, the court held that the plaintiff m a fear-of-cancer
case who cannot prove physical injury or illness must prove (1) that as a result of the
defendant's negligence, the plaintiff was exposed to a toxic substance that threatens cancer,
and (2) that his fear results from knowledge, corroborated by reliable medical or scientific
opinion, that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will develop cancer in the future due
to the toxic exposure. Id. at 816. The Potter court also created an exception to the more-
likely-than-not requirement. Id. at 817 If the plaintiff in a fear-of-cancer case can prove
neither that he suffered a physical injury nor that it is more likely than not that he will
develop cancer, the plaintiff may still recover if he proves (1) that as a result of the
defendant's negligence, the plaintiff was exposed to a toxic substance that threatens cancer,
(2) that the defendant acted with oppression, fraud, or malice, and (3) that the plaintiff's fear
of cancer results from knowledge, corroborated by reliable medical or scientific opinion, that
the toxic exposure has significantly increased the plaintiff's risk of cancer. Id. at 818. The
Potter court found that Firestone's actions fell under the exception for oppression, fraud, or
malice. Id. Therefore, the court remanded the issue to the lower courts. Id. at 827
270. Kerins v Hartley, 868 P.2d 906, 906 (Cal. 1994); see Lopez v Leal, 29 Cal. Rptr.
2d 832, 839 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that AIDS-phobia plaintiff who suffered no physical
injury failed to satisfy Potter test by failing to establish actual exposure to virus). But see
Carrollv Sisters of SaintFrancis Health Servs., Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585, 592-93 (Tenn. 1993)
(questioning applicability of fear-of-cancer decisions to AIDS-phobia claims because of
umque deadliness of AIDS and potentially long latency period of HIV).
271. For further discussion ofJohnsonv WestVa. Umv Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889
(W Va. 1991), see supra notes 185-206 and accompanying text.
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Carroll,2' likely will become the consensus.273 If, however, California
rules that no proof of exposure is necessary, the tide eventually may shift in
favor of the view expressed in Faya.' Given the development of Vir-
ginia's common law of negligently inflicted emotional distress, however,
reflection upon that common law, rather than adherence to an emerging
majority trend, should serve as a guide in resolving whether actual exposure
or physical injury or both are prerequisites for recovery of emotional distress
damages in AIDS-phobia cases in Virginia. 5
IV A Suggested Approach for Virginia Courts
in Deciding AIDS-Phobia Cases
A. Intentionally Inflicted Emotional Distress
The Supreme Court of Virginia in Womack adopted the test for
intentionally inflicted emotional distress that appears in Restatement section
46.6 The courts of New Jersey and Minnesota have done the same.'
272. ForfurtherdiscussionofCarrollv Sisters of SaintFrancis HealthServs., Inc., 868
S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1993), see supra note 207-29 and accompanying text.
273. See Kerins v Hartley, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 629 (Ct. App. 1993) (noting majority
trend requires proof of actual exposure to virus to recover in AIDS-phobia case), vacatedand
transferred for reconsideration, 868 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1994); Carroll, 868 S.W.2d at 590
(noting that slight majority of jurisdictions favor actual exposure requirement); Brian R.
Garves, In Fear-of-AIDS Cases, ProofIs Key Elem ent, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 26, 1993, at 27, 32
(noting overwhelming view that fear of contracting AIDS must be reasonable and that
reasonableness requires proof of actual exposure); Maroulis, supra note 140. at 239 (stating
that most courts have demed recovery m AIDS-phobia cases m which plaintiff was unable to
prove actual exposure).
274. For further discussion of Faya v. Alnaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993), see supra
notes 231-52 and accompanying text.
275. See Maroulis, supra note 140, at 260-61 (arguing that AIDS-phobia plaintiff must
satisfy common-law rule applicable mparticular junsdiction by demonstrating either physical
injury or impact); see also id. at 250-51 (stating that arguments for limitations on recovery
of emotional distress damages apply equally to AIDS-phobia clans).
276. Womackv Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1974); see REsTATEMENT, supra
note 48, § 46 (allowing recovery for intentionally inflicted emotional distress absent physical
injury). For further discussion of Womack, see supra notes 38-64 and accompanying text.
277 See Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Minn. 1983)
(adopting Restatementtest for recovery for intentionally inflicted emotional distress); Buckley
v Trenton Say. Fund Soc'y, 544 A.2d 857, 863 (N.J. 1988) (same).
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Bohonovsky27s and Benson279 illustrate that a court easily can apply that
test to AIDS-phobia suits in which the plaintiff seeks damages for intention-
ally inflicted emotional distress.' The Restatement standard guarantees
the genuineness of claims that pass all of its hurdles."s The most signifi-
cant of those hurdles are the requirements that the defendant's conduct be
outrageous' and that the plaintiff's emotional distress be severe.' The
former was at issue in Benson,' whereas failure to demonstrate the latter
led to dismissal of the claim in Bohonovsky '
In a cause of action alleging intentionally inflicted emotional distress
in the AIDS-phobia context, a Virginia court should apply the Womack test
to the facts before it. Because AIDS is an invariably fatal disease,2 6 an
278. For further discussion of J.B. v. Bohonovsky, 835 F Supp. 796 (D.N.J. 1993),
see supra notes 142-52 and accompanying text.
279. For further discussion of K.A.C. v. Benson, Nos. C6-93-1203, C5-93-1306, C4-
93-1328, 1993 WL 515825 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1993), review granted, (Minn. Feb.
24, 1994), see supra notes 153-62 and accompanying text.
280. See Bohonovs'y, 835 F. Supp. at 800-02 (applying Restatementtestandholding that
plaintiff failed to allege sufficient severity of emotional distress); Benson, 1993 WL 515825,
at *2 (applying Restatement test and holding that genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous); see also Baranowski v Torre,
No. CV90-0236178, 1991 WL 240460, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov 7, 1991) (applying
Restatement test to AIDS-phobia plaintiff's claim of intentionally inflicted emotional distress);
Whelan v. Whelan, 588 A.2d 251, 252-53 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991) (same). For further
discussion of Bohonovsky and Benson, see supra notes 142-62 and accompanying text.
281. See Womack v. Eldndge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1974) (noting that
outrageousness requirement serves to limit frivolous suits).
282. See RESTATEmENT, supra note 48, § 46 cmt. d (stating that defendant's conduct
must be atrocious, utterly intolerable in civilized community, and so extreme and outrageous
as to exceed all possible bounds of decency).
283. See id. § 46 cmt. j (requiring that emotional distress be so severe that no reasonable
man could be expected to endure it).
284. K.A.C. v. Benson, Nos. C6-93-1205, C5-93-1306, C4-93-1328,1993WL 515825,
at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1993), review granted, (Minn. Feb. 24, 1994).
285. J.B. v Bohonovsky, 835 F Supp. 796, 802 (D.N.J. 1993).
286. See, e.g., Kerins v Hartley, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 624 (Ct. App. 1993) (noting
that AIDS is fatal in 100% of known cases), vacated and transferredfor reconsideration, 868
P.2d 906 (Cal. 1994); Faya v Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 329 (Md. 1993) (noting that AIDS
is invariably fatal); Bramer v. Dotson, 437 S.E.2d 773, 774-75 (W Va. 1993) (noting that
diagnosis of AIDS is tantamount to death sentence).
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AIDS-phobia defendant will have great difficulty in convincing the court that
the intentional or reckless conduct that proximately caused the plaintiff's fear
of AIDS was not outrageous as a matter of law ' However, the require-
ment that the plaintiff prove the severity of the claimed emotional distress
will give the court an objective standard with which to evaluate the
genuineness of the plaintiff's claim and will help to ensure that spurious
clams will not reach the jury ' The concern with fraudulent claims of
intentionally inflicted emotional distress in the AIDS-phobia context is no
different from the concern in any cause of action alleging intentionally
inflicted emotional distress.2 9 Therefore, Virginia courts should use the
Womack test in the AIDS-phobia context as well.
B. Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress
After Hughes,' a plaintiff alleging negligently inflicted emotional
distress in Virginia must demonstrate physical manifestations of that
emotional distress and must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant's negligence proximately caused the emotional distress, which in
turn caused the physical injury 29 In an effort to avoid fraudulent or
287 See Baranowski v Torre, No. CV90-0236178, 1991 WL 240460, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 1991) (asserting that prevalence and consequences of AIDS are so widely
recognized that intentional exposure of another to AIDS clearly falls within conduct
proscribed by Restatement § 46); see also Benson, 1993 WL 515825, at *2 (holding that
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether defendant's conduct was extreme and
outrageous); Robert B. Gamor, Note, To Have and to Hold. The Tort Liability for the
Interspousal Transmission ofAIDS, 23 NEw ENG. L. REV 887,900 (1988-89) (asserting that
intentionally or recklessly exposing one's spouse to AIDS constitutes outrageous conduct and
warrants recovery of emotional distress damages even if exposed spouse does not contract
AIDS).
288. See Russo v White, 400 S.E.2d 160, 163 (Va. 1991) (denying recovery in case of
intentionally inflicted emotional distress on ground that plaintiff failed to allege emotional
distress severe enough to support cause of action); see also Naccash v Burger, 290 S.E.2d
825, 831 (Va. 1982) (noting that Womackrequirements serve to discourage spurious claims).
But cf. Gamor, supra note 287, at 900 (asserting that proof of sexual intercourse with AIDS-
infected spouse constitutes evidence of plaintiff's having suffered severe emotional distress).
289. SeeBohonovsky, 835 F Supp. at 800-02 (applymgRestatementtest to AIDS-phobia
claim without discussion of applicability); Benson, 1993 WL 515825, at *2 (same).
290. For further discussion of Hughes v Moore, 197 S.E.2d 214 (Va. 1973), see supra
notes 93-110 and accompanying text.
291. Hughes, 197 S.E.2d at 219.
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trivial claims, the Virginia Supreme Court has erected two significant
barriers to recovery of damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress.
The plaintiff must prove physical injury and must also present clear and
convincing evidence of an unbroken causal connection between the alleged
act and the physical injury 2Z In applying this standard to AIDS-phobia
cases, Virginia courts should require proof by the plaintiff of either physical
injury resulting from the emotional distress or actual exposure to the AIDS
virus. 
2
The courts in Faya and Johnson295 looked to the common law
of their jurisdictions to require proof of a demonstrable physical injury
before allowing the plaintiff to recover emotional distress damages.'
Similarly, Virginia courts should look to Virginia precedent and apply
Hughes's clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard in AIDS-phobia cases
292. Id., see Ney v. Landmark Educ. Corp., No. 92-1979, 1994 WL 30973, at *3 (4th
Cir. Feb. 2, 1994) (per cunam) (reiterating Virginia's requirement of proof that physical
injury accompany negligently inflicted emotional distress); Naccash, 290 S.E.2d at 831
(noting that Hughes requirements serve to discourage spurious claims).
293. See infra notes 316-22 and accompanying text (arguing that Virginia courts should
require AIDS-phobia plaintiff clamung negligently inflicted emotional distress to prove either
physical injury or actual exposure to virus). The Virginia Supreme Court has allowed
recovery of emotional distress damages for fear of contracting AIDS when the emotional
distress is pendent to a claun of medical malpractice. Howard v Alexandria Hosp., 429
S.E.2d 22, 24-25 (Va. 1993). In such cases, proof of exposure to the virus is irrelevant. See
Steinhagen v United States, 768 F Supp. 200, 208 (E.D. Mich.) (allowing plaintiff to
recover emotional distress damages for fear of contracting AIDS without proof of actual
exposure because emotional distress clain was pendent to claim of medical malpractice),
vacated per stipulation, 778 F Supp. 353 (E.D. Mich. 1991);-Kaehne v Schmidt, No. 90-
1108, 1991 WL 121030, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. May 15, 1991) (allowing plaintiff to recover
emotional distress damages for fear of contracting AIDS without proof of actual exposure
because emotional distress claim was pendent to negligence claim), review denied, 474
N.W.2d 107 (Wis. 1991). But see McQuaig v McLaughlin, 440 S.E.2d 499, 503 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1994) (rejecting plaintiffs' contention that fear of contracting AIDS constitutes element
of pam and suffering pendent to medical malpractice claim on ground that plaintiffs alleged
no physical injury). For further discussion of Howard, see supra note 13.
294. For further discussion of Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993), see supra
notes 231-52 and accompanying text.
295. For further discussion of Johnsonv. West Va. Umv Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889
(W Va. 1991), see supra notes 185-206 and accompanying text.
296. Faya, 620 A.2d at 337-39; Johnson, 413 S.E.2d at 892.
757
51 WASH. & LEE L. REV 717 (1994)
concerning claims of negligently inflicted emotional distress.2" This
heightened standard will help prevent fraudulent or spurious claims and
avoid a flood of litigation."
Virginia case law has established that a plaintiff cannot recover for
negligently inflicted emotional distress absent a showing of some physical
injury 299 No reason exists for Virginia courts to abandon this rule in
AIDS-phobia cases." In fact, the purpose of this requirement-
demonstration that the claim is genuine°'-may be more important in the
AIDS context than outside of it.' As AIDS becomes more widespread,
incidental contact with people and objects carrying the disease will occur
more frequently ' The physical injury requirement helps to ensure that
such incidental, harmless contact does not become the subject of endless
297 See Hughes v Moore, 197 S.E.2d 214, 219 (Va. 1973) (requiring clear and
convincing evidence of causal connection between defendant's negligence, plaintiff's
emotional distress, and resultant physical injury).
298. Compare Naccash v Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 831 (Va. 1982) (stating that Hughes
requirements serve to discourage spurious claims) with Neal v Neal, 873 P.2d 881, 889
(Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (stating concern that allowing AIDS-phobia plaintiff's claim would
invite speculative claims and would allow recovery without proof that disease-causing agent
was present), aff'd, 873 P.2d 871 (Idaho 1994).
299. See Hughes, 197 S.E.2d at 219 (requiring physical injury for recovery for
negligently inflicted emotional distress); see also Ney v Landmark Educ. Corp., No. 92-
1979, 1994 WL 30973, at *3 (4th Cir. Feb. 2, 1994) (per cunam) (reiterating Virgima's
requirement that plaintiff prove physical injury to recover for negligently inflicted emotional
distress).
300. See Maroulis, supra note 140, at 260-61 (arguing that courts should require AIDS-
phobia plaintiffs to show either physical injury or physical impact depending upon which
common-law rule applies mthatjunsdiction). ButseeMarrs, supranote 111, at39 (asserting
that courts are shifting focus away from physical injury as assurance of genuineness and
towards evaluation of totality of evidence to determine genuineness, seriousness, and
reasonableness of alleged emotional distress).
301. See Naccash, 290 S.E.2d at 831 (noting that Hughes requirements serve to
discourage spurious claims).
302. But see Zook, supra note 196, at 492 (asserting that application of physical injury
requirement in attempt to discourage fraudulent or frivolous AIDS-phobia claims prevents
recovery for genuine clains).
303. See Lani, supra note 6, at 89 n.95 (tracing increased incidence of AIDS since
1981); Maroulis, supra note 140, at 226 (noting that AIDS has reached nearly epidemic
proportions); Zakarin, supra note 139, at 265 (noting 100-fold increase in AIDS since its
discovery in 1981).
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litigation in which the key issue is the highly speculative fear of a plaintiff
who may be ignorant of the infinitesimal risk of contracting the disease
through such contact.'
In Naccash,'° however, the Supreme Court of Virginia fashioned
an exception to the physical injury rule.' In Naccash, the plaintiffs,
despite alleging no physical injuries of their own, recovered damages for
emotional distress that the defendant's negligent prenatal care of their unborn
child caused.' Although the court subsequently limited the Naccash
holding to its facts,' the rationale behind the decision fits easily into the
context of AIDS-phobia cases. In Naccash, the court stated:
The restrictions upon recovery imposed by the provisos mHughes
were designed to discourage spurious claims asserted by
chance witnesses to physical torts involving others. The consider-
ations prompting impositionof the limitations do not exist here; no
one suggests that the Burgers' emotional distress was feigned or
that their claim was fraudulent. Indeed, to apply the restrictions
here "would constitute a perversion of fundamental principles
of justice."'
In other words, the facts giving rise to the cause of action left no doubt in
the court's collective mind that the claim was genuine.'
In an AIDS-phobia case in which the plaintiff is able to prove actual
exposure to the virus, the same analysis applies. Given the deadliness of
AIDS, a plaintiff actually exposed to the virus undoubtedly will suffer great
emotional distress because of the increased possibility of a premature death.
304. See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 88 (noting efforts of AIDS activists to spread
message that AIDS is not easily transmitted); Lawn, supra note 6, at 99 (arguing m favor of
requirement of actual exposure m AIDS-phobia cases m order to prevent idle claims based
on irrational fears); Maroulis, supra note 140, at 226-27, 251 (noting widespread public
ignorance and misunderstanding concerning transmittal of AIDS).
305. For further discussion of Naccashv. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982), see supra
notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
306. Naccash, 290 S.E.2d at 831.
307 Id.
308. Myseros v. Sissler, 387 S.E.2d 463, 464 n.2 (Va. 1990).
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Therefore, the genuineness of that plaintiff's claim for emotional distress
damages in such a context would be beyond dispute."' Thus, Virginia
courts should allow an AIDS-phobia plaintiff who fails to allege physical
injury to recover emotional distress damages upon proof of actual exposure
to the virus."' Virginia courts also should allow such a plaintiff to
recover without proof of actual exposure provided that the plaintiff proves
that some physical injury resulted from the emotional distress."1 In both
situations, the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant's negligence caused the emotional distress." 4
V Conclusion
In AIDS-phobia cases in which the plaintiff claims damages for
intentionally inflicted emotional distress, Virginia courts should apply the
four-pronged test for recovery originally set forth in Restatement section 46
and adopted by Virginia in Womack."' This test furthers the public policy
of allowing only valid claims of emotional distress to reach the jury
The same policy should govern actions seeking damages for
negligently inflicted emotional distress. Courts in Maryland and West
Virginia have followed those states' established common law by requiring
that an AIDS-phobia plaintiff prove physical injury in order to recover for
311. See Bramer v Dotson, 437 S.E.2d 773, 774-75 (W Va. 1993) (allowing AIDS-
phobia clami for emotional distress damages despite plaintiff's failure to allege physical
injury). The Bramer court echoed the reasoning m Naccash by stating that, given the umque
deadliness of AIDS, conventional wisdom mandates that fear of AIDS triggers genuine-not
spurious-claims of emotional distress. Id.
312. See Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 831 (Va. 1982) (allowing recovery for
negligently inflicted emotional distress despite lack of proof of physical injury); see also
Lopezv Leal, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 832,839 (Ct. App. 1994) (requiring proof of actual exposure
to virus when AIDS-phobia plaintiff is unable to prove physical injury); Bramer, 437 S.E.2d
at 774-75 (allowing recovery of emotional distress damages in AiDS-phobia case without
proof of physical injury).
313. See Hughes v Moore, 197 S.E.2d 214,219 (Va. 1973) (requiring proof ofphysical
injury for recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress).
314. See id. (requiring clear and convincing proof of causal connection between
defendant's negligence, plaintiff's emotional distress, and resultant physical injury).
315. Womack v Eldndge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1974). For further discussion of
Womack, see supra notes 38-64 and accompanying text.
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negligently inflicted emotional distress. 16 Tennessee and West Virginia
have required proof of actual exposure to the virus to assure the court that
the claim is reasonable,317 whereas Maryland and one California court
have expressly disavowed that requirement." 8 Virginia's common law of
negligently inflicted emotional distress requires proof of physical injury and
clear and convincing evidence of the causal connection between the
defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's emotional distress and consequent
physical injury 319
An AIDS-phobia plaintiff in Virginia should be able to recover
damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress upon proof of physical
injury However, based on the rationale behind Naccash,l a plaintiff
able to prove actual exposure to the virus should recover damages despite
having suffered no physical ailments. Therefore, subject to clear and
convincing proof of a causal connection, the plaintiff in an AIDS-phobia case
in Virginia should recover damages upon proof of either a physical injury
resulting from the negligently inflicted emotional distress or actual exposure
to the virus that causes AIDS.11 Each of these requirements satisfies the
public policy that demands a threshold guaranteeing the genuineness of
emotional distress claims.m
Edward Benedict Lumpkin
316. Faya v Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 337-39 (Md. 1993); Johnson v West Va. Umv.
Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 892 (W Va. 1991).
317 Carrollv Sisters ofSamtFrancis HealthServs., Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585, 594 (Tenn.
1993); Johnson, 413 S.E.2d at 893.
318. Kerns v Hartley, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 632 (Ct. App. 1993), vacated and
transferredfor reconsideration, 868 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1994); Faya, 620 A.2d at 336-37
319. Hughes v Moore, 197 S.E.2d 214, 219 (Va. 1973).
320. For further discussion of Naccashv Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982), see supra
notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
321. But see Maroulis, supra note 140, at 261 (arguing that courts should require AIDS-
phobia plaintiffs to prove both physical injury and actual exposure in order to recover
emotional distress damages).
322. See Naccash, 290 S.E.2d at 831 (stating that Hughes and Womack requirements
serve to discourage spurious claims).

